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DEPORTING FAMILIES: LEGAL MATTER OR 
POLITICAL QUESTION? 
Angela M. Banks* 
ABSTRACT 
Last year 245,424 noncitizens were removed from the United 
States, and courts played virtually no role in ensuring that these 
decisions did not violate individual substantive rights like freedom of 
speech, substantive due process, or retroactivity. Had these 
individuals been deported from a European country, domestic and 
regional courts would have reviewed the decisions to ensure 
compatibility with these types of rights. Numerous international law 
scholars and immigration scholars seek to minimize the gap between 
the legal processes offered in the United States and Europe for 
noncitizens challenging deportation orders. Many of these scholars 
contend that greater recognition of international human rights in U.S. 
courts would bring U.S. deportation jurisprudence closer to its 
European counterpart. While appealing, these arguments fail to 
recognize that the availability of rights is not what distinguishes the 
European deportation jurisprudence from the American deportation 
jurisprudence. European courts play a more active role in reviewing 
deportation decisions than U.S. courts because of institutional 
cultural norms regarding the State interests at stake in regulating 
immigration. European adjudicators conceptualize immigration 
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regulation as a legal matter rather than as a political matter as U.S. 
adjudicators do. This distinction between “immigration regulation is 
political” and “immigration regulation is legal” leads to different 
understandings of the judicial role and thus, to drastically different 
approaches to judicial review.  
Deportation jurisprudence provides a useful case for analyzing the 
relationship between legal rules and institutional culture in protecting 
individual rights. The literature addressing the domestic enforcement 
of human rights under-analyzes the role that institutional culture 
plays in human rights enforcement. This literature tends to focus on 
the importance of adopting specific laws, an independent judiciary, 
political will at the highest levels of government, and effective law 
enforcement personnel. While these are all important factors, 
institutional culture helps to explain compliance problems when 
States have the right laws, personnel, and political will. This Article 
addresses this gap in the literature by exploring the relationship 
between judicial norms regarding immigration and judicial review of 
deportation decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Last year 245,424 noncitizens were removed from the United 
States, and courts played virtually no role in ensuring that these 
decisions conformed to the substantive provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution.1 A number of these individuals, like Charlie Castillo, 
lived the majority of their lives in the United States and considered 
the United States home. Charlie immigrated to the United States at 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 tbl.37 
(2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf 
[hereinafter 2008 YEARBOOK]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS: 2008, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ 
publications/enforcement_ar_08.pdf [hereinafter IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008]. This 
figure reflects the individuals removed through regular removal proceedings. An additional 113,462 
individuals were removed in expedited removal proceedings. These proceedings take place at the border 
and do not involve an immigration judge. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 
1225 (2006). 
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the age of one and spent his entire life in the Detroit metro area.2 He 
is fifty-four years old and spent thirty-three years working at General 
Motors factories and retired with a pension.3 He married a U.S. 
citizen and raised three children in a house he purchased in the 
suburbs.4 Charlie was also convicted of growing two marijuana plants 
in his yard and possessing a quarter-pound of marijuana in his home 
ten years ago.5 Despite the fact that Charlie’s entire family resides in 
the United States, his wife suffers from multiple sclerosis, and he is 
responsible for supporting his grandchild with autism, Charlie was 
deported in October 2009.6 He had taken his wife to Cancun 
believing that the environment would be good for her multiple 
sclerosis.7 Upon his return to the United States, immigration officials 
at the airport became aware of his criminal convictions and Charlie 
was subsequently deported.8 When Charlie was convicted he paid 
fines and was allowed to return home to his suburban ranch house.9 
He thought that he “had paid [his] dues and that [he] was all right.”10 
Yet because Charlie’s parents brought him to the United States, he 
was wrong. No court was able to review his case for proportionality 
or consistency with other fundamental rights principles. Had 
Charlie’s family migrated to Europe instead, his legal process would 
have been different and his outcome may have been as well.11 
Numerous international law scholars and immigration scholars 
seek to minimize the gap between the legal processes offered in the 
United States and Europe for noncitizens challenging deportation 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Charlie Leduff, Stuck Between Old Charges, Post–9/11 Convictions, THE DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 
14, 2010, at A4, available at 2010 WLNR 770911.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Leduff, supra note 2. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. As used throughout this article Europe and European refer to the following States: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom—the twenty-seven Member States of the 
European Union. See European Union, European Countries, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/ 
index_en.htm. 
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orders.12 Many of these scholars contend that greater recognition of 
international human rights in U.S. courts would bring U.S. 
deportation jurisprudence closer to its European counterpart.13 While 
appealing, these arguments fail to recognize that the availability of 
rights is not what distinguishes the European deportation 
jurisprudence from the U.S. deportation jurisprudence. European 
courts play a more active role in reviewing deportation decisions than 
U.S. courts because of institutional cultural norms regarding the State 
interests at stake in regulating immigration. European adjudicators 
conceptualize immigration regulation as a legal matter rather than as 
a political matter as U.S. adjudicators do. This distinction between 
“immigration regulation is political” and “immigration regulation is 
legal” leads to different understandings of the judicial role and thus, 
to drastically different approaches to judicial review. I contend that 
this distinction is tied to the different immigration histories, sources 
of State authority to regulate immigration, and allocations of 
immigration authority in the United States and Europe. As long as 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Immigration scholars frequently question the propriety of the U.S. judiciary’s deference to the 
political branches. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); BILL O. HING, DEPORTING OUR 
SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY (2006); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE 
FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (2007); 
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW (1996); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of 
Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 925 (1995) 
[hereinafter Ten More Years]; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 268–69 (1984) [hereinafter Plenary Congressional 
Power]; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) [hereinafter Procedural Surrogates]; 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms 
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter Phantom Constitutional Norms]; 
James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 
804, 805 (1983); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 
(1993). 
 13. See, e.g., Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating 
International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139 (2006); Shayana 
Kadidal, “Federalizing” Immigration Law: International Law as a Limitation on Congress’s Power to 
Legislate in the Field of Immigration, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 501 (2008); Lori A. Nessel, Families at 
Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration Policies Threaten the Immigrant Family in 
the European Union and the United States, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271 (2008); Kenneth Roth, The 
Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347 (2000). 
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immigration regulation is seen as a political issue, U.S. courts will 
continue to play a minimal role in reviewing deportation decisions.  
Deportation jurisprudence provides a useful case for analyzing the 
relationship between legal rules and institutional culture in protecting 
individual rights. The literature addressing the domestic enforcement 
of human rights under-analyzes the role that institutional culture 
plays in human rights enforcement.14 This literature tends to focus on 
the importance of adopting specific laws, an independent judiciary, 
political will at the highest levels of government, and effective law 
enforcement personnel. While these are all important factors, 
institutional culture helps to explain compliance problems when 
States have the right laws, personnel, and political will. This Article 
addresses this gap in the literature by exploring the relationship 
between judicial norms regarding immigration and judicial review of 
deportation decisions. 
Part I of this Article critically analyzes the deportation 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. I demonstrate that despite a 
general recognition of substantive individual rights, courts defer to 
the decisions of political actors when reviewing deportation decisions 
pursuant to the plenary power doctrine. This doctrine dictates that 
“Congress and the executive branch have exclusive decision-making 
authority without judicial oversight for constitutionality” when 
regulating immigration.15 It is my contention that this deference 
grows out of (1) the United States’ experience with Chinese 
immigration in the late nineteenth century, (2) the basis for the 
State’s authority to regulate immigration, and (3) the allocation of 
that authority to the federal government exclusively. 
In Part II I extend this analysis to the European jurisprudence and 
contend that the same factors—immigration history, source of 
immigration authority, and allocation of immigration authority—
supported the use of proportionality review of challenges to 
deportation decisions. European adjudicators utilize proportionality 
                                                                                                                 
 14. For a notable exception see Galit A. Sarfaty, Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: 
The Marginality of Human Rights at the World Bank, 103 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 647 (2009). 
 15. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (2006). 
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review not because of the availability of specific individual rights, 
but because immigration is seen as a legal matter subject to 
traditional forms of judicial review. U.S. adjudicators conceptualize 
their authority and competence differently and thus provide less 
monitoring of deportation decisions. Based on these insights, Part III 
critiques the U.S. process as inadequate for protecting individual 
rights, but argues that the European jurisprudence cannot be as easily 
replicated in the United States as its proponents contend. The 
conceptualization of immigration regulation as a traditional legal 
issue, rather than a political matter, is the most valuable insight from 
the European jurisprudence. Yet our immigration history, source of 
State authority to regulate immigration, and allocation of immigration 
authority make it difficult to view immigration as something other 
than political decisions about national sovereignty.16 Part III 
concludes with sketching a discursive strategy for shifting our 
conceptualization of immigration from a political national 
sovereignty issue to a traditional legal issue. This strategy is based on 
the increasing use of deportation as a tool for crime control. 
I.  ADJUDICATING DEPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Noncitizens in the United States and in Europe frequently 
challenge deportation decisions as a violation of their fundamental 
rights. Despite the broad similarities with regard to democratic 
governance and commitment to individual rights, these challenges are 
handled very differently in these jurisdictions. U.S. courts treat these 
challenges as political questions while European courts treat them as 
legal questions. These differences have serious implications for the 
judicial protection of noncitizens’ fundamental rights. Parts I and II 
analyze the jurisprudence of each of these jurisdictions to reveal the 
differences in immigration histories, sources of State authority to 
regulate immigration, and allocations of immigration authority. This 
                                                                                                                 
 16. By national sovereignty I am referring to the physical, political, social, and cultural integrity of 
the State. Throughout this Article when referring to nation states I will use the word State with a capital 
“S.” When referring to the states that make up the United States I will use the word state with a lower 
case “s.” 
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analysis illustrates that treating deportation as a political question 
limits the role of the judiciary in protecting noncitizens’ fundamental 
rights. The European treatment of these challenges as legal questions 
ensures that noncitizens have a forum in which claims of rights 
violations will be heard and decided.   
A.  Framing Deportation 
It is my contention that the differences in U.S. and European 
deportation jurisprudence stem from the different frames that 
decision makers utilize when analyzing challenges to deportation 
decisions. American adjudicators rely on one frame while European 
adjudicators rely on another because they are working with different, 
albeit similar, legal tool kits. An adjudicator’s legal tool kit includes 
principles, norms, values, legal doctrine, precedent, and rules. By 
frame I am referring to the “schemata of interpretation” utilized by 
legal decision makers to make sense of the State interests involved in 
the regulation of immigration. Erving Goffman introduced this term 
in 1974 as a way to refer to “schemata of interpretation” that allow an 
individual “to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite 
number of concrete occurrences . . . .”17 The success of a given frame 
is tied to the ability of the frame to resonate with individuals. 
Whether or not a frame will resonate depends in large degree on the 
extent to which the frame aligns with the interpretative framework 
that individuals rely upon. In the case of legal decision makers, their 
interpretative framework is their legal tool kit. 
Lawyers and adjudicators rely upon frames when making and 
analyzing legal arguments. Frames assist lawyers in focusing 
decision makers’ attention on specific facts and issues.18 Facts and 
issues can often fit within multiple doctrinal categories, and decisions 
regarding which category to use can significantly impact decision-
making. For example, the regulation of immigration can be seen as an 
                                                                                                                 
 17. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21 
(1974). 
 18. Morton Horwitz, Framing Devices, THE BRIDGE, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/Framing/ 
framing1.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (“[G]ood lawyers when describing the facts of cases often 
select narrative frames that cast in favorable light the behavior of their clients.”). 
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issue that primarily concerns national sovereignty or alternatively 
local police powers.19 Each of these conceptions of immigration 
implicates different legal doctrines and standards of judicial review. 
Historically both of these conceptions of immigration have existed 
within U.S. immigration jurisprudence.20 With the adoption of the 
plenary power doctrine the national sovereignty frame has 
dominated.21 By national sovereignty I am referring to a State’s 
interest in protecting the physical integrity of the State in addition to 
specific political, social, and cultural attributes of the State. These 
interests are connected to foreign affairs, national security, and self-
definition—matters over which the federal government is considered 
to have authority. Recently, however, there has been a surge in state 
and local government efforts to regulate immigrants, which has 
resurrected the debate over the most appropriate conception of 
immigration for judicial review purposes.22 Both of these approaches 
to conceptualizing immigration reflect the use of a particular frame. 
The dominance of the national sovereignty frame within U.S. 
immigration jurisprudence reflects our history with immigration, 
source of State authority to regulate immigration, and allocation of 
immigration authority. These same factors counsel in favor of the use 
of a public order frame in Europe.  
                                                                                                                 
 19. By local police powers I am referring to the power of states to protect public health, safety, and 
morals.  
 20. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1833, 1894–96 (1993) (discussing state regulation of migration in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries). 
 21. There are additional explanations for the limited judicial review provided in this context. 
Examples include: immigrants are guests whose presence in the United States is a bonus, noncitizens 
benefit from international law and should not have the benefit of U.S. constitutional protection and 
international legal protection in this context, noncitizens are not entitled to constitutional protection in 
this context because of their noncitizen status, or the power to exclude and deport is absolute and not 
subject to domestic legal limits. Stephen Legomsky has outlined these options in great detail in 
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 268–69 
(1984). I have chosen to focus on the role of national sovereignty because it corresponds with the 
international legal norms and rules that the Court relied upon in creating the plenary power doctrine, and 
I believe that it continues to best explain the U.S. Supreme Court’s deferential approach. 
 22. See, e.g., Cristina Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration 
Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008). 
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B.  The Development of the Plenary Power Doctrine 
The United States’ immigration history is fraught with 
contradictions. While the Statue of Liberty proclaims the United 
States as a refuge for the world’s tired, poor, and “huddled masses 
yearning to breathe free,” the reality for non-European immigrants 
has been quite different.23 The Supreme Court developed the plenary 
power doctrine through a number of cases addressing the individual 
rights of Chinese immigrants to enter and reside in the United States. 
At the time that these cases were being decided, animosity toward 
Chinese immigrants had been growing for decades. Justice Field 
provided an overview of Chinese immigration that highlights this 
history. He noted that Chinese laborers  
were generally industrious and frugal. Not being accompanied by 
families, except in rare instances, their expenses were small; and 
they were content with the simplest fare, such as would not 
suffice for our laborers and artisans. The competition between 
them and our people was for this reason altogether in their favor, 
and the consequent irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, 
was followed, in many cases, by open conflicts, to the great 
disturbance of the public peace. The differences of race added 
greatly to the difficulties of the situation. . . . [T]hey remained 
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering 
to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed 
impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any 
change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in 
numbers each year the people of the coast saw, or believed they 
saw, in the facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions 
of China, where population presses upon the means of 
subsistence, great danger that at no distant day that portion of 
our country would be overrun by them unless prompt action was 
taken to restrict their immigration.24  
                                                                                                                 
 23. EMMA LAZARUS, The New Colossus, in 1 THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS 202–03 (1889).  
 24. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889) (emphasis added). 
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Hostility towards Chinese immigrants was growing throughout the 
mid-to-late-1800s, and during this time period California enacted 
legislation limiting the rights of Chinese immigrants.25 Proponents of 
restricting Chinese immigration realized, however, that federal action 
was needed to accomplish their goal. By 1882 Congress was listening 
and enacted the first legislation limiting the immigration of Chinese 
laborers. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act suspended the entry of 
Chinese laborers for ten years.26 These entry prohibitions did not 
apply to Chinese laborers present in the United States as of 
November 17, 1880, or those arriving within ninety days after the 
passage of the act.27 To enforce these provisions, Chinese laborers 
eligible to remain in the United States had to obtain a certificate upon 
their departure from the United States that would facilitate their 
return. The certificate was evidence of eligibility to be admitted to the 
United States under the terms of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.28 
Enforcement of this law became difficult because individuals were 
allowed entry into the United States based on evidence of prior 
residence other than the government-issued certificate. Significant 
concerns regarding fraud led to the enactment of the 1884 Chinese 
Exclusion Act, which made the government-issued certificate the 
only valid evidence for establishing a Chinese laborer’s right to 
reenter the United States.29 This amendment was still not deemed 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See id. at 595–97; MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 16–17; RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A 
DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 79–131 (1989). California had adopted numerous 
measures aimed at reducing the Chinese population in California. For example, in 1852 there was a tax 
on Chinese miners to push them into other employment. MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 16–17. In 1879 a 
statute was enacted that “required incorporated towns and cities to remove Chinese from their city 
limits.” Id. at 17. San Francisco enacted an ordinance in 1880 regulating the location of laundries. In 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins the U.S. Supreme Court found that the ordinance was only enforced against Chinese 
subjects operating laundries and as such was a violation of Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Federal courts also struck down similar laws restricting the rights of 
Chinese migrants as violations of either the Burlingame or 1880 treaties. Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domain, 93 
VA. L. REV. 571, 616–17 (2007). 
 26. An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) 
(amended 1884) [hereinafter 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act]. 
 27. Id. at sec. 3; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 599. 
 28. 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 26, at sec. 4. 
 29. An Act to Amend an Act entitled “An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to 
Chinese Approved May sixth eighteen hundred and eighty-two,” ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (1884) 
[hereinafter 1884 Chinese Exclusion Act]; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 25–26 (noting that it 
was hard to enforce the Chinese Exclusion Act “because it was not clear who was exempt as a returning 
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sufficient to address the concerns of Congress so the 1888 Chinese 
Exclusion Act was enacted, which prohibited Chinese laborers from 
returning to the United States even if they had a certificate.30  
Congress was willing to restrict Chinese immigration because 
Chinese immigrants were seen as a threat to national sovereignty. 
The Court viewed Chinese immigration as a form of aggression by 
China and a threat to social cohesion in the United States.31 In the 
face of such threats, Justice Field concluded that if the U.S. 
government “through its legislative department, considers the 
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not 
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their 
exclusion is not to be stayed.”32 Concerns about Chinese immigration 
were discussed in terms of aggression, peace, security, and 
assimilation—all aspects of national sovereignty. This perception of 
the State interests at stake facilitated the Court’s conclusion that the 
State’s authority to regulate immigration is based on its sovereign 
power to defend the State and is unlimited.  
In Chae Chan Ping, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States33 and Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States,34 the Court relied on international legal 
principles to support its conclusions regarding the source and scope 
of a State’s authority to regulate immigration.35 The commentary by 
                                                                                                                 
Chinese immigrant who had originally arrived in the United States before the effective date of the ten-
year moratorium.”); TAKAKI, supra note 25, at 79–131.  
 30.  A Supplement to an Act entitled “An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to 
Chinese,” approved the sixth day of May eighteen hundred and eighty-two, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 
(1888) [hereinafter 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act]. The law provided that  
it shall be unlawful for any chinese laborer who shall at any time heretofore have been, or 
who may now or hereafter be, a resident within the United States, and who shall have 
departed, or shall depart, therefrom, and shall not have returned before the passage of this 
act, to return to, or remain in, the United States. 
Id. at sec. 1. 
 31. Justice Field wrote, “It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, 
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its people 
crowding in upon us.” Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 656 (1892). While this case addresses claims by 
a Japanese immigrant rather than a Chinese immigrant, the Court expresses similar concerns about 
national sovereignty as it did in Chae Chan Ping. 
 34. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 35. This Article focuses on these three cases in the development of the plenary power doctrine 
because these cases represent the culmination of the doctrine. The foundation for this doctrine, however, 
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leading international law scholars that the Supreme Court relied upon 
reinforced the relationship between national sovereignty and 
immigration regulation.36 In each of these cases the Court’s reference 
to international law highlights a specific national sovereignty 
concern. Chae Chan Ping challenged his exclusion from the United 
States,37 and the Court’s initial question was whether or not Congress 
had the power to prohibit Chinese laborers who had previously 
resided in the United States from returning.38 The Court responded 
with a resounding yes, stating that this conclusion is “not . . . open to 
controversy.”39 A State’s “[j]urisdiction over its own territory to that 
extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is part of its 
independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent 
subject to the control of another power.”40 Any exception to this 
                                                                                                                 
was laid decades earlier in cases conflating federalism constraints with individual rights constraints. See 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY—LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA ch. 3 (1987).  
 36. After concluding that international law did not limit a State’s immigration authority, the Court 
held that the Constitution delegated immigration authority to the political branches of the federal 
government. At no time did the Court seek to determine whether or not the U.S. Constitution provided a 
different set of limits on the State’s immigration authority. In other work I have argued that this move 
reflects the Court’s desire to maintain maximum flexibility for the State in international political 
decision-making. Angela M. Banks, The Trouble with Treaties: Immigration & Judicial Review, ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 37. Chae Chan Ping had resided in San Francisco, California from 1875 until June 1887 when he 
traveled to China. When he departed he had a certificate that pursuant to the 1882 and 1884 Chinese 
Exclusion Acts permitted his admission to the United States upon his return. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 
at 582. While he was away, the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted, which prohibited his entry 
into the United States despite his possession of a certificate of identity. He arrived back in San Francisco 
on October 8, 1888, just seven days after the passage of the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act. Id. Chae Chan 
Ping challenged the validity of the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act as a violation of the U.S. Constitution, 
the 1880 treaty between the United States and China, and the 1882 and 1884 Chinese Exclusion Acts. Id. 
at 599–600. The 1880 treaty provided:   
[w]henever, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the coming of 
Chinese laborers to the United States, or their residence therein, affects or threatens to 
affect the interests of that country, or to endanger the good order of the said country or of 
any locality within the territory thereof, the Government of China agrees that the 
Government of the United States may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or 
residence, but may not absolutely prohibit it. 
Id. at 596. 
 38. Id. at 603. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 603–04. The Court subsequently quotes Chief Justice Marshall in The Exchange v. 
McFaddon, stating that any restriction upon a State’s jurisdiction within its territory “would imply a 
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the 
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general principle “must be traced up to the consent of the nation 
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.”41 Nishimura 
Ekiu similarly challenged her exclusion from the United States, and 
Justice Gray relied on international law to conclude that her exclusion 
was lawful.42 Justice Gray’s opinion begins by stating that 
[i]t is an accepted maxim of international law that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners 
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and 
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.43 
Justice Gray cited the work of Vattel and Phillimore to support this 
proposition.44 In one of the Vattel works cited by the Court, Vattel 
discusses a State’s right to exclude noncitizens. He contends that a 
“sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory either to foreigners 
in general or in particular cases, or to certain persons or for certain 
particular purposes, according as he may think it advantageous to the 
state.”45 In an ironic twist, given the use of Vattel to support the 
exclusion of Chinese laborers, Vattel explains that China forbade all 
foreigners from entering the State out of a concern that foreigners 
                                                                                                                 
same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.” Id. at 604 (quoting Exch. v. McFaddon, 
11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812)). 
 41. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604.   
 42. She was denied admission based on the commissioner’s conclusion that she was “a person 
without means of support, without relatives or friends in the United States,” and “a person unable to care 
for herself, and liable to become a public charge.” Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 656 
(1892). Ms. Ekiu arrived in San Francisco with $22.00 and told the commissioner that “she has been 
married two years, and that her husband has been in the United States one year, but she does not know 
his address.” Id. at 652. She was to “stop at some hotel until her husband calls for her.” Id. The 
commissioner’s actions were taken pursuant to an 1891 immigration law prohibiting the admission of 
“[a]ll idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from 
a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other 
infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 653 n.1. Ms. Ekiu challenged the 
1891 immigration statute, arguing that granting the commissioner of immigration, superintendent of 
immigration, and the secretary of the treasury with exclusive authority to determine her ability to be 
admitted to the United States deprived her of liberty without due process of law. Id. at 656. 
 43. Id. at 659. 
 44. Id. 
 45. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 169–70 (Joseph Chitty, trans., T & J. W. Johnson & 
Co., 1863) (1758). 
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would “corrupt the manners of the nation.”46 Vattel states that this 
action was “not at all inconsistent with justice” and in fact was 
“salutary to the nation, without violating the rights of any individual, 
or even the duties of humanity, which permits us, in case of 
competition, to prefer ourselves to others.”47 Phillimore expresses 
similar sentiments in Commentaries Upon International Law stating 
that “[i]t is a received maxim of International Law, that the 
Government of a State may prohibit the entrance of strangers into the 
country, and may therefore regulate the conditions under which they 
shall be allowed to remain in it, or may require and compel their 
departure from it.”48 Justice Gray continues his use of international 
law in Fong Yue Ting, in which the State’s power to deport 
noncitizens was challenged.49 Building upon Chae Chan Ping and 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at 170. 
 47. Id. (noting however that justice would require granting “human assistance to those whom 
tempest or necessity obliged to approach their frontiers”). Connected to the right of a sovereign to 
exclude, Vattel discusses the right of a sovereign to place conditions on the entrance of noncitizens. Id. 
at 171 (“Since the lord of the territory may, whenever he thinks proper, forbid its being entered (§94), he 
has, no doubt, a power to annex what conditions he pleases to the permission to enter.”). A similar 
obligation to humanity, however, simultaneously limits a sovereign’s ability to exclude. See id. at 171 
(“[W]e shall see, in Chap. X., how his duty towards all mankind obliges him, on other occasions, to 
allow a free passage through, and a residence in his state.”). In Chapter X Vattel states that States are 
“bound to grant a passage [through the State] for lawful purposes, whenever he can do it without 
inconvenience to himself.” Id. at 183. Vattel later explains that States “cannot, without particular and 
important reasons, refuse permission, either to pass through or reside in the country, to foreigners who 
desire it for lawful purposes.” Id. at 184. The law of nature does not give States a right to refuse entry in 
these circumstances. Id. at 184–85 (noting that a State cannot “without some particular and cogent 
reason, refuse the liberty of residence to a foreigner who comes into the country with the hope of 
recovering his health, or for the sake of acquiring instruction in the schools and academies.”).   
 48. 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW, pt. III ch. X § 219, 192–93 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1985). 
 49. This case challenges the 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, which extended the 1888 Chinese 
Exclusion Act for an additional ten years, and required all Chinese laborers within the United States to 
obtain a certificate of residence. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1892); An act to prohibit 
the coming of Chinese persons into the United States, 27 Stat. 25 (May 5, 1892) [hereinafter 1892 
Chinese Exclusion Act]. Failure to have a certificate of residence was grounds for deportation. Id. at sec. 
6. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury stated that in order to obtain a 
certificate of residence, a Chinese laborer must provide an affidavit “of at least one credible witness of 
good character” attesting to the Chinese laborer’s residence and lawful status within the United States. 
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 701 n.1. If a Chinese laborer were found without the required certificate the 
individual would have the opportunity to prove to the satisfaction of the court and “by at least one 
credible white witness, that he was a resident of the United States at the time of the passage of this act.” 
1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, supra, at sec. 6. If these requirements were met a certificate of residence 
would be issued. Id. Fong Yue Ting arose after three Chinese laborers were arrested and detained for 
failure to have the required certificate of residence. One petitioner was denied the certificate because he 
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Ekiu, Justice Gray states early in his opinion for the Court that the 
“right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been 
naturalized, or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the 
country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and 
unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the 
country.”50 Justice Gray contends that it is every State’s inalienable 
right to exclude and expel in order to protect safety, independence, 
and welfare.51  
The connection between immigration and national sovereignty was 
not unknown within international law; it was an association made by 
many commentators.52 The commentators relied upon by the 
Supreme Court agreed that a State’s right to exclude and expel is 
absolute when the State’s security is in jeopardy. Vattel noted that a 
State can refuse entry to aliens when there was “just cause to fear that 
                                                                                                                 
was unable to produce a credible witness regarding his residence and lawful status. The only witnesses 
the petitioner could produce were Chinese and the collector of internal revenue (the officer issuing the 
certificates) concluded that these witnesses were not credible. The collector required the petitioner to 
“produce a witness other than a Chinaman,” which the petitioner was unable to do because “there was 
no person other than one of the Chinese race who knew and could truthfully swear that he was lawfully 
within the United States on May 5, 1892, and then entitled to remain” in the United States. Fong Yue 
Ting, 149 U.S. at 703–04. The petitioners contended that they were arrested and detained without due 
process of law and that section 6 of the 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act was unconstitutional. Fong Yue 
Ting, 149 U.S. at 704. 
 50. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707. 
 51. Id. at 711. To support the idea that a sovereign State’s right to exclude and expel is “absolute and 
unqualified” Justice Gray relies upon the work of Vattel, Ortolan, and Phillimore. Fong Yue Ting, 149 at 
707–08. Justice Gray similarly relied upon the commentary of Vattel and Phillimore in Ekiu. Ekiu, 142 
U.S. at 659. The passages selected from each of these international law scholars support the idea that 
sovereign States have the right to exclude and expel, yet they do not suggest an unlimited right. In fact 
Vattel’s statements emphasize the need for a State’s safety to be in jeopardy in order to exclude or expel 
noncitizens. Fong Yue Ting, 149 at 707–08 (citing EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS Book 
I, §§ 230, 231; ORTOLAN, DIPLOMATIE DE LA MER, (4th Ed.) lib. 2, c. 14, p. 297; 1 ROBERT 
PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d Ed.) c. 10, § 220). The Supreme Court’s 
discussion of international law and the sovereign rights of States to exclude and expel presents the 
matter as being conclusive. There are no references to Vattel’s conditions regarding public safety or 
national security or any indication that international legal scholars disagreed about the scope of the 
power to exclude and expel noncitizens. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: 
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 
81 TX. L. REV. 1, 83–87 (2002) (discussing international legal commentators who identified additional 
restrictions on a State’s power to exclude and expel). Rather, the Supreme Court used a national 
sovereignty frame to analyze the State’s power to exclude and expel, which allowed the Court to focus 
on the State’s responsibility to self-preservation and conclude that the State’s power to regulate 
immigration was unencumbered. 
 52. Cleveland, supra note 51, at 83.  
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they will corrupt the manners of citizens; that they will create 
religious disturbances, or occasion any other disorder, contrary to the 
public safety. In a word, it has a right, and is even obliged, in this 
respect, to follow the suggestions of prudence.”53 The Supreme Court 
may not have explicitly discussed these limitations on the right to 
exclude and expel because it saw the cases as falling squarely within 
the exception that gave a State an unfettered right to exclude and 
expel—to protect national sovereignty.54 As such, the United States 
had absolute sovereignty to exclude and expel.55 
The U.S. governance system is one of delegated authority, and 
thus, the Court had to identify a constitutional source of authority for 
the federal government to regulate immigration.56 This was not a 
straightforward task because authority over immigration is not 
enumerated within the U.S. Constitution. The closest explicit 
delegation of immigration authority is Article I’s statement that 
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.”57 However, additional federal powers include 
declaring war, making treaties, suppressing insurrections, repelling 
invasions, and regulating foreign commerce.58 Based on a structural 
approach to identifying government powers, the Court concluded that 
the immigration power sits with the political branches of the federal 
government because of its connection to the aforementioned 
enumerated powers.59 In Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, the 
                                                                                                                 
 53. VATTEL, supra note 45, at 108 
 54. See Cleveland, supra note 51, at 83–87; Nafziger, supra note 12, at 816–23. 
 55. The congressional records regarding the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Court’s opinions in 
Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting indicate that the immigration power was exercised to facilitate self-
preservation. 
 56. In the cases establishing the plenary power it was Congress’ authority to enact the various 
Chinese Exclusion Acts that were at issue in addition to the authority of executive officials to execute 
other immigration laws, such as the 1891 immigration act.  
 57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 58. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). “The United States are a sovereign 
and independent nation, and are vested by the constitution with the entire control of international 
relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control, and to make it 
effective.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1892).  
 59. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 12, at 154–59; Legomsky, Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 12, 
at 268–69. Elsewhere I argue that the use of treaties to regulate immigration from 1776 through the mid-
nineteenth century reinforced the Court’s perception of immigration as a national sovereignty matter. 
See Banks, supra note 36. 
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Court concluded that Congress was authorized to enact the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts.60 In Ekiu the Court similarly concluded that the 
commissioner was lawfully authorized to detain Ekiu based on the 
1891 Immigration Act.61 Due to the deeply political nature of 
national sovereignty matters, the Court also concluded that the 
judicial branch should defer to the judgments and decisions of the 
political branches.62 In Chae Chan Ping the Court concluded that the 
immigration decisions of the political branches are “conclusive upon 
the judiciary.”63 It is this conclusion regarding institutional 
competence that solidifies the plenary power doctrine. This doctrine 
stipulates that in regulating immigration “Congress and the executive 
branch have exclusive decision-making authority without judicial 
oversight for constitutionality.”64 The Court concluded that because 
immigration authority was delegated to the federal political branches 
of government and because these decisions implicate sensitive 
political matters, courts should exercise self-restraint and defer to the 
decisions of the political actors. By linking immigration to national 
sovereignty, the Court limited its ability to play a significant role in 
monitoring State use of the immigration power.  
The development of this limited judicial role is connected to the 
U.S. experience with Chinese immigration at the time that the 
immigration power was challenged. The Supreme Court Justices 
shared the perspective that Chinese immigration during the late 
nineteenth century represented a threat to U.S. sovereignty and thus 
viewed immigration as a matter related to self-defense and foreign 
affairs. The Court utilized commentary by international legal scholars 
to bolster the conclusion that immigration regulation implicates these 
specific State interests. Based on our constitutional structure of 
government, the Court concluded that the political branches of the 
federal government were granted authority over national defense and 
foreign affairs. Concluding that these areas of expertise are entitled to 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–12. 
 61. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 664 (1892). 
 62. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–12. 
 63. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
 64. MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 27. 
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deference from the judiciary, the Court adopted the plenary power 
doctrine and decided that admission and deportation decisions are 
“conclusive upon the judiciary.”65 Despite greater recognition of 
individual rights vis-à-vis the federal government in the United 
States, judicial review of deportation decisions has remained 
minimal. It is my contention that these factors giving rise to the 
plenary power doctrine continue to guide the Court’s understanding 
of its competence in the area of immigration. 
C.  The Plenary Power Doctrine in the Twentieth Century  
Deportation presents a series of difficult challenges to noncitizens 
who are long-term residents of the United States. As noted by David 
Wood, “Losing the right to live in what one regards as one’s 
homeland can be seen as even more serious a deprivation than losing 
one’s liberty.”66 Long-term residents create families and become 
integral parts of local communities. Often the families created are 
mixed-status families that include U.S. citizens.67 The retroactive 
nature of deportation grounds creates uncertainty as to what behavior 
or activities could lead to deportation and thus the separation of 
families. Furthermore, the drastic expansion of aggravated felony 
deportation grounds raises serious questions about the proportionality 
of deportation in a number of circumstances.68 The 1996 Illegal 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606–08. 
 66. David Wood, Deportation, the Immigrants Power, and Absorption into the Australian 
Community, 16 FED. L. REV. 288, 288 (1986). 
 67. A growing number of U.S. citizen children are living in mixed status families. In 2008, four 
million U.S. citizen children had a parent who was an unauthorized immigrant. Jeffrey S. Passel, A 
Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, Pew Research Center Publications (Apr. 14, 
2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1190/portrait-unauthorized-immigrants-states. Approximately two 
million families in the United States are comprised of U.S. citizen children and at least one unauthorized 
immigrant parent. Kari Lydersen, ‘Mixed-Status’ Families Look to Obama, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2008, 
at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/15/ 
AR2008111502436.html. 
 68. An aggravated felony is a term of art defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA). The current list of aggravated felonies includes murder, rape, sexual abuse of a 
minor, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in firearms or explosive materials, money laundering, crime of 
violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year, theft (including receipt of stolen 
property), burglary, extortion, child pornography, racketeering or gambling, prostitution offenses, 
slavery offenses, espionage offenses, fraud or deceit involving a loss of more than $10,000, alien 
smuggling, improper alien entry, and immigration related document fraud. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) 
expanded the conduct that constitutes an aggravated felony and 
increased the immigration consequences of such a conviction.69 For 
example, since 1996, receipt of stolen goods is conduct that will 
constitute an aggravated felony, as is murder. If an individual has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony, that person no longer has 
access to discretionary relief from deportation, and they are barred 
from being readmitted to the United States permanently.70 Despite 
these potential consequences, the plenary power doctrine continues to 
limit the ability of courts to review deportation orders for consistency 
with individual fundamental rights.  
Noncitizens have access to statutory discretionary relief, but this 
does not adequately address review of substantive constitutional 
challenges. Discretionary relief prevents certain individuals from 
being deported, but not because these deportation decisions are 
deemed to violate a substantive constitutional right. The Immigration 
and Naturalization Act empowers the Attorney General to cancel 
removal in particular kinds of cases. The following discussion 
outlines the statutory discretionary relief available and contends that 
it inadequately addresses fundamental rights challenges. Through an 
analysis of twentieth century immigration cases, I demonstrate that 
                                                                                                                 
1101 (2006). Noncitizens have been deported for minor criminal convictions. Mary Gibbs was facing 
deportation in 2000 for writing five bad checks in 1976 totaling around $100. Anthony Lewis, Measure 
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A13, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/15/opinion/abroad-at-home-measure-of-justice.html. Similarly Il Choi 
was deemed deportable due to a guilty plea to shoplifting a $39 item in 1994. Id. Thirty-two year old 
Xuan Wilson had resided in the United States for twenty-eight years when she was facing deportation 
for writing a forged check in the amount of $19.83 at age twenty-three. Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught 
in Congressional Fishnets-Immigration Law’s New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 591 
(1998–1999). A fifty-four year old woman from Annandale, Virginia was convicted of stealing perfume 
in 1987 and sentenced to four years in prison. Pamela Constable, Years Later, Immigrants Pursued by 
Their Pasts; Even Minor Offenses Now Mean Deportation, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at B1. She was 
paroled after eight months, but she was facing deportation ten years later pursuant to the 1996 reforms. 
Id. 
 69. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, div. C, sec. 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587 to -597 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229-1229c (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and 
Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1891 
(2000).  
 70. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (2006). 
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immigration continues to be considered a political, rather than a legal, 
matter. 
1.  Discretionary Relief from Deportation 
Congress has recognized that immigration adjudicators should 
have some discretion in determining which noncitizens eligible for 
deportation should actually be deported. The provision of 
discretionary relief is provided for in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA). The Attorney General is authorized to grant cancellation 
of removal, which restores or grants the noncitizen lawful permanent 
resident status.71 Before 1996, discretionary relief from deportation 
was primarily available through sections 212(c) and 244 (suspension 
of deportation). Section 212(c) relief was available to lawful 
permanent residents (LPR) who had resided in the United States for 
at least seven years. Otherwise, deportable noncitizens who had been 
continuously present in the United States for seven years, who had 
good moral character, and whose deportation would cause extreme 
hardship to the noncitizen or their citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or 
child, was eligible for suspension of deportation.72 The INA granted 
the Attorney General the discretion to grant these forms of relief from 
deportation, and the discretion was exercised by the Executive Office 
of Immigration Review.73 In 1996, with the passage of IIRAIRA, 
these forms of relief from deportation were eliminated and replaced 
with cancellation of removal.74 Cancellation of removal is available 
to LPRs who have held that status for at least five years, have resided 
in the United States for at least seven years, and have not been 
convicted of an aggravated felony.75 For noncitizens who do not meet 
these criteria, cancellation of removal is available if the noncitizen 
has been physically present in the United States for at least ten years, 
is a person of good moral character, has not been convicted of 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006).  
 72. Id. § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. §1254a (2006). 
 73. The Executive Office of Immigration Review includes immigration judges and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. 
 74. INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006). 
 75. Id. § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a) (2006). 
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specified crimes,76 and demonstrates that his or her removal would 
“result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s 
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”77  
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) outlined the 
appropriate standards for granting cancellation of removal because 
the prerequisites listed above are the only guidance given to the 
Attorney General.78 In Matter of C-V-T-, the BIA concluded that as 
with exercising discretion in section 212(c) cases, an immigration 
judge “must balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s 
undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane 
considerations presented in his (or her) behalf to determine whether 
the granting of . . . relief appears in the best interest of this 
country.”79 Favorable factors considered by immigration judges 
include family ties to the United States, length of residence in the 
United States, evidence of hardship to the individual deemed 
deportable and his or her family in the case of deportation, 
employment history, property or business ties to the United States, 
service in the U.S. Armed Forces, value and service to the 
community, proof of genuine rehabilitation from criminal behavior, 
and other evidence of good character.80 Adverse factors considered 
by immigration judges include the nature and underlying 
circumstances of the exclusion or deportation ground at issue, 
additional significant violations of U.S. immigration law, a criminal 
record, and other evidence of bad character.81 Immigration judges 
evaluate these factors in individual cases, but this analysis is not 
                                                                                                                 
 76. These crimes include convictions for activities such as crimes involving moral turpitude, 
violations of controlled substance laws, convictions for two or more offenses for which the aggregate 
sentence of imprisonment was more than five years, prostitution, human trafficking, money laundering, 
aggravated felonies, domestic violence, and immigration document fraud. Id. §§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), 
237(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), 1227(a)(3) (2006). 
 77. Id. § 240(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
 78. C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (BIA 1998–2000) (“Section 240A(a) does not provide express 
direction as to how this discretion is to be exercised.”). 
 79. Id. (quoting Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (BIA 1978)).  
 80. Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (BIA 1978). 
 81. Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584. Immigration judges evaluating claims for cancellation of removal 
rely on the same factors outlined in Matter of Marin for section 212(c) relief. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 7, 11–12 (1998).  
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available as a matter of right. It is only available to those Congress 
has deemed eligible, and the analysis only considers affiliation and 
hardship factors. Concerns regarding fundamental rights, such as ex 
post facto laws, cannot be raised in these proceedings.82 Thus, Article 
III courts continue to have an important role to play in immigration 
adjudication. 
2.  Legal Relief from Deportation  
In addition to seeking discretionary relief, noncitizens can also 
legally challenge a deportation order; yet, it will be difficult to obtain 
robust administrative or judicial review of substantive constitutional 
challenges. Within the United States the initial phase of challenging a 
removal order or obtaining discretionary relief is administrative. The 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, within the Department of 
Justice, oversees immigration judges and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. Currently, noncitizens seeking to challenge a deportation 
order must first raise their claim before an immigration judge during 
a removal proceeding.83 During this proceeding the noncitizen is 
permitted to challenge the deportation order as violating procedural 
due process requirements. Yet immigration judges do not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional challenges.84 Consequently, 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See infra text accompanying notes 85–86 for additional discussion about jurisdiction over 
substantive constitutional claims. Furthermore, the Attorney General can only cancel a limited number 
of removals annually. Consequently this form of relief may not be available to all noncitizens who can 
demonstrate the requisite hardship.  
 83. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(1) (2006). 
 84. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Both 
the [immigration judge] conducting the deportation proceeding and the Government agree that neither 
the [immigration judge] nor the BIA has jurisdiction to consider a selective enforcement claim during a 
deportation proceeding.”); Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“Moreover, it is settled 
that the immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act 
and the regulations.”); Santana, 13 I. & N. Dec. 362, 365 (BIA 1969) (“And the proper function of this 
tribunal in the administrative scheme does not encompass passing upon constitutional questions such as 
this.”); see also Panitz v. District of Columbia, 112 F.2d 39, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (“It is this consideration 
for the orderly, efficient functioning of the processes of government which makes it impossible to 
recognize in administrative officers any inherent power to nullify legislative enactments because of 
personal belief that they contravene the constitution. Thus it is held that ministerial officers cannot 
question the constitutionality of the statute under which they operate.”); Samuel, Bonat & Bro. Inc., 81 
N.L.R.B. 1249, 1250 (1949) (“The Board [NLRB] has held that as an administrative agency created by 
Congress it cannot question the constitutionality of the Act which created it and that it will leave such 
questions to the courts for determination.”). 
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any challenge based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, Equal Protection, 
the First Amendment, or Fifth Amendment liberty rights cannot be 
decided by an immigration judge.85 Immigration judges have 
similarly concluded that they do not have jurisdiction to review 
challenges based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). Due to the status of the ICCPR as a non-self-
executing treaty for which implementing legislation has not been 
adopted, the ICCPR cannot form the basis of a claim in a U.S. 
court.86 Decisions by immigration judges are appealable to the BIA, 
which does not have jurisdiction over substantive constitutional 
challenges either.87 Certain BIA decisions are appealable to federal 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence states or suggests that noncitizens do not have 
constitutional rights within the immigration context. The Court has stated that noncitizens do not have 
an independent right to enter the United States, but when faced with deportation the Court has held that 
noncitizens are entitled to procedural due process in deportation proceedings. See Chew v. Colding, 344 
U.S. 591, 596–98 (1952); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1903). The plenary power 
doctrine, which limits judicial review of immigration decisions, is based on the notion of absolute 
sovereignty and deference to the political branches, not a conclusion that noncitizens lack constitutional 
rights. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 12, at 153–64. In the admissions context the Court has repeatedly 
concluded that excluded noncitizens have not been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Rather than concluding that noncitizens seeking admission 
to the United States have no right to due process, the Court has held that the process provided by 
administrative officials constitutes due process of law. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 
(1892). 
 86. See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 133–34 (2nd Cir. 2005). The United States 
has yet to adopt implementing legislation due to the contention that the U.S. Constitution protects all of 
the ICCPR rights for which there is no reservation, declaration, or understanding. Kenneth Roth, The 
Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 349 (2000). 
The United States explained this position in its periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee: 
Similarly, because the basic rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (other than those to which the United 
States took a reservation) have long been protected as a matter of federal constitutional 
and statutory law, it was not considered necessary to adopt special implementing 
legislation to give effect to the Covenant’s provisions in domestic law. That important 
human rights treaty was accordingly ratified in 1992 shortly after the Senate gave its 
advice and consent. 
U.S. REPORT UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (July 1994), 
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/law/Covenant94/05.html. For example, the United States has 
explained that ICCPR article 17’s protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, while the right to family privacy is protected by the First 
Amendment. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2005), at art. 17, para. 291, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/55504.htm#art17. 
 87. Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 532. 
23
Banks: Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
512
courts, and questions of law, including substantive constitutional 
challenges, can be raised before the federal courts.88 Yet, pursuant to 
the plenary power doctrine, the federal courts apply deferential 
standards of review to substantive constitutional challenges, which 
results in essentially no review.  
Noncitizens wishing to challenge a deportation order as a violation 
of their substantive rights, such as First or Fifth Amendment rights, 
will find that federal courts only look to ensure that the government 
had a rational basis for its decision.89 In a number of cases 
challenging deportation orders based on membership in the 
Communist Party, the Court failed to conduct the robust judicial 
review one would expect in cases raising First and Fifth Amendment 
claims. In Galvan v. Press, decided in 1954, the Court relied on 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy to conclude that there was no First 
Amendment violation.90 Yet when reviewing the Fifth Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
 89. The judiciary similarly defers to the decisions of political actors in the admissions context. When 
the wife of a U.S. citizen was excluded based on security grounds and was denied a hearing to review 
the exclusion, the Court then stated that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due 
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537, 542–44 (1950). 
 90. In Harrisiades v. Shaughnessy, the petitioners challenged the 1940 Alien Registration Act, 8 
U.S.C. § 137 (1940), (54 Stat. 670), as a violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. 542 U.S. 
580, 594 (1952). This act made noncitizens who had ever been a member of an organization that 
advocated the forceful or violent overthrow of the United States government during their residence in 
the United States deportable. Id. at 581–83. Thirteen years earlier the Court decided that the Act of 
October 16, 1918, which made noncitizens deportable for membership in an organization that believes 
in, advises or teaches the overthrow, by force or violence, of the Government of the United States, only 
applied to current members. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939). Past membership did not make a 
noncitizen deportable pursuant to the Act of October 16, 1918. Id. at 698. Congress was unhappy with 
this holding and enacted the 1940 Alien Registration Act clearly making membership in an organization 
that advocates the overthrow of the U.S. government by force or violence at any time cause for 
deportation. Harisiades, 542 U.S. at 593–94. Each of the noncitizens in this case had at one time during 
their residence in the United States been members of the Communist Party. Harisiades, 542 U.S. at 581–
83. The petitioner also argued that the 1940 Alien Registration Act deprived them of liberty without due 
process of law. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, began by outlining the relationship between 
national sovereignty and immigration and ultimately declined to evaluate the constitutionality of the 
deportation ground. Harisiades, 542 U.S. at 585–90. Justice Jackson stated that “in the present state of 
the world, it would be rash and irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or qualify the 
Government’s power of deportation.” Harisiades, 542 U.S. at 591 (“Reform in this field must be 
entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our international relations and treaty-making 
powers.”). Both Galvan and Harisiades were decided after Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951), which held that membership in the Communist Party was not protected speech. Thus, the First 
Amendment holdings in these immigration cases were consistent with non-immigration First 
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claims in Galvan, the Court lamented that it was not writing upon a 
clean slate, but rather that “a whole volume” of history had been 
written regarding “the power of Congress under review.”91 Justice 
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, remarked that due to the expanding 
notion of substantive due process, a clean slate would have allowed 
the Court to see the Due Process Clause as limiting “the scope of 
political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in 
regulating the entry and deportation of aliens” and possibly 
categorizing deportation as punishment making the Ex Post Facto 
Clause relevant.92 Absent a clean slate, Justice Frankfurter noted that 
noncitizens facing deportation are entitled to procedural due process 
but Congress is “entrusted exclusively” to formulate the necessary 
policies.93 Relying on precedent, the Court declined to reevaluate the 
plenary power doctrine and review Mr. Galvan’s Fifth Amendment 
claim. Rather, the Court noted that the “power of Congress over the 
admission of aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very 
broad.”94 
In 1972, the Supreme Court opened the door to a more robust 
judicial monitoring role of immigration decisions.95 In Kleindienst v. 
Mandel the Court was faced with a First Amendment challenge to a 
denial of admission.96 Rather than stating that the Court could not or 
would not review this substantive constitutional claim, the Court 
sought to determine whether or not the government had a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason for the admission denial.97 This is the 
first time that the Court articulated a standard for reviewing 
substantive constitutional challenges to immigration decisions. 
Interestingly, the rights challenged in this case were those of U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
Amendment cases. The petitioners also raised an ex post facto claim, but the Court concluded that the ex 
post facto clause only applied to criminal laws. Id.   
 91. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
 92. Id. at 530–31. 
 93. Id. at 531. 
 94. Id. at 530. 
 95. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 619. 
 96. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).   
 97. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769–70. In 1952 the Court reviewed a First Amendment challenge but held 
that the conduct under review was not protected under the First Amendment. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 
342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952). 
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citizens in addition to those of Mandel. The appellees claimed that 
U.S. citizens’ First Amendment rights were being infringed upon due 
to the government’s decision not to admit Ernest Mandel.98 The 
Court evaluated the U.S. citizens’ constitutional claims but not 
Mandel’s claims. The Court reiterated a recurring theme within 
immigration jurisprudence—that admission to the United States is a 
privilege; noncitizens do not have a right to enter the United States.99 
In reviewing the U.S. citizens’ claims, the Court utilized a standard of 
review much more deferential than would apply in a non-immigration 
First Amendment case.100 The Court required Mandel’s exclusion to 
be based upon a facially legitimate and bona fide reason:  
[W]hen the Executive exercises this power negatively on the 
basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will 
neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by 
balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests 
of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.101  
The U.S. citizen appellees argued that the First Amendment should 
prohibit executive officials from denying waivers for admissions 
absent justification.102 The Court concluded that the facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason standard was satisfied because the 
Attorney General provided a reason for denying Mandel a waiver—
engaging in activities beyond the scope of the stated purpose of a 
previous trip to the United States.103  
                                                                                                                 
 98. Mandel was a Belgian journalist seeking entry to meet with U.S. academics and students. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 753, 756. The Court specifically noted that it “is clear that Mandel personally, as an 
unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant 
or otherwise.” Id. at 762. 
 99. Id. at 762; see also United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
 100. First Amendment challenges involve fundamental rights, and restrictions on fundamental rights 
are generally subjected to strict scrutiny analysis by the courts.  
 101. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.   
 102. Mandel had been deemed inadmissible due to his support of communist doctrines, but 
unbeknownst to him he had been granted a waiver allowing his admission to the United States in the 
past. Id. at 756. Mandel was denied a waiver for his inadmissibility in 1969 because “he had engaged in 
activities beyond the stated purposes” of his 1968 trip. Id. at 757–58. 
 103. Id. 
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The facially legitimate and bona fide reason standard of review 
was also utilized by the Court in Fiallo v. Bell, another case in which 
admission decisions were challenged by U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents.104 In this case three unwed fathers challenged 
the definitions of child and parent within the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act as violations of the First, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments.105 The INA grants preferential immigration status to 
the children of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. Child 
was defined to include “an unmarried person under 21 years of age 
who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, 
or an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his 
relationship with his natural mother.”106 The appellants in this case 
failed to qualify as parents but would have satisfied the definition if 
they had been mothers. Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the 
appellants claimed that the INA denied them equal protection.107 In 
response to this claim, the Court began by noting that the scope of the 
Court’s inquiry is limited when reviewing immigration legislation 
because “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of 
Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.”108 
Relying on their recent decision in Mandel, the Court held that if the 
government’s policy decision regarding the definition of child and 
parent is based on a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” then 
the Court will not “look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor 
test it by balancing its justification against” the constitutional rights 
of citizens or LPRs challenging the INA.109 In applying this standard 
of review, the Court deferred not only to a facially legitimate and 
bona fide reason articulated by the government, but to such reasons 
inferred by the Court. In Fiallo, the Court stated that preferential 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 105. Id. at 790–91. 
 106. Id. at 788. An individual is a parent based on their relationship with a “child” under the INA. Id.  
 107. The equal protection claim was not limited to discrimination on the basis of sex, but also the 
father’s marital status and the illegitimacy of the child. Id. at 791. 
 108. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 109. Id. at 794–95 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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immigration status “is not warranted for illegitimate children and 
their natural fathers, perhaps because of a perceived absence in most 
cases of close family ties as well as a concern with the serious 
problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity determinations.”110 
Yet, as noted by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion, the 
legislative history did not provide any indication as to why the 
admission privilege was denied to children born out of wedlock and 
their fathers, and that the lack of such information suggests that the 
decision was “very likely ‘habit, rather than analysis or actual 
reflection.’”111  
Despite the deferential nature of the standard of review applied in 
Mandel and Fiallo, these cases mark a significant break from the 
nineteenth century conclusion that the immigration decisions of the 
political branches are “conclusive upon the judiciary.”112 For the first 
time, the Court acknowledges that the State’s use of the power to 
regulate immigration is subject to constitutional limitations and that 
the judiciary will monitor and evaluate the use of that power. District 
and appellate federal courts have broadened the role of the courts in 
monitoring and evaluating immigration decisions based on the 
openings provided in Mandel and Fiallo. Most notably, these courts 
have utilized the rational basis test to review equal protection and 
substantive due process challenges to deportation orders, have 
expanded the procedural due process exception to the plenary power 
doctrine, and have created new exceptions to the doctrine.113 The 
Supreme Court, however, has not ratified these strategies.114 Rather, 
the Court has played a more active role in reviewing immigration 
decisions through statutory interpretation and the interpretation of 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. at 799 (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 811 & n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222 
(1977)). 
 112. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
 113. Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 12, at 930–34. 
 114. See, e.g., Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F. Supp 827 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 
1977); Lieffi v. United States INS, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev’d in unreported decision, 529 
F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 12, at 934 (noting that the 
“Supreme Court has decided no cases in which the constitutionality of congressional action in the field 
of immigration has been at issue”). 
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other subconstitutional texts.115 These strategies have not, however, 
given rise to meaningful review of deportation decisions. 
Use of the rational basis test to review constitutional challenges to 
deportation orders represents a significant departure from the plenary 
power doctrine as applied in Fong Yue Ting. This approach mirrors 
the developments created in Mandel and Fiallo in which the Supreme 
Court looked for a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for the 
government’s action.116 In applying the rational basis standard of 
review, courts determine whether or not the immigration laws or 
regulations are rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.117 The cases applying this standard of review have typically 
concluded that the government’s interest in regulating migration is 
legitimate and the challenged laws and regulations are rationally 
related to that purpose.118 In the few cases in which a court has 
concluded that there is a constitutional violation, the decision was 
reversed on appeal.119 The courts continuously conclude that aliens 
do not represent a suspect class and that the immigration action does 
not interfere with fundamental rights. 120 Consequently, more robust 
standards of review are not applicable. Thus, Congress’s decisions 
about which categories of noncitizens are deportable and Executive 
decisions about which individual noncitizens are deportable are not 
subject to robust judicial review.   
The use of rational basis review for equal protection and 
substantive due process challenges is a dramatic break from the 
standards of review applied to similar challenges in non-immigration 
cases.121 Several district courts have acknowledged this mismatch in 
the First Amendment context. In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 12, at 560.  
 116. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972); Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 1479. 
 117. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (applying rational basis review to 
a state law creating an age classification). 
 118. See Legomsky, Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 12, at 296 n.215 
 119. See id. at 296 n.216. 
 120. See, e.g., Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1027 (2d. Cir. 1975) (concluding that denying the 
ability to extend voluntary departure dates did not interfere with right to marry or raise a family); 
Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970) (deportation of American citizen’s spouse did not 
violate constitutional right to live together); Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (same). 
 121. See Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 151–54. 
29
Banks: Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
518
Committee v. Meese (AADC)122 and Rafeedie v. INS,123 the district 
courts concluded that traditional First Amendment standards applied 
in both deportation cases and exclusion cases. In AADC, which 
addressed a First Amendment challenge to a deportation order based 
on selective enforcement, the district court was reversed on other 
grounds by the court of appeals, but dicta in the Supreme Court 
opinion suggests that the traditional First Amendment analysis would 
not be applicable in cases challenging deportation.124 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, notes that requiring the government to 
provide the information necessary to conduct a First Amendment 
analysis may disclose “foreign-policy objectives” or “foreign 
intelligence products and techniques.”125 Here, the separation of 
powers concerns raised in Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting continue to 
support limited judicial review of substantive constitutional 
challenges to deportation decisions. Justice Scalia’s opinion reflects 
the continuing notion that immigration regulation implicates national 
sovereignty interests and therefore presents political, rather than 
legal, questions. 
The protection of procedural due process is another limitation on 
the reach of the plenary power doctrine. Since 1903 when Yamataya 
v. Fisher was decided, the plenary power doctrine has not limited 
judicial review of procedural due process claims.126 As a result of this 
exception, “[j]udges with constitutional misgivings about an 
immigration decision by the government have ameliorated the 
harshness of the plenary power doctrine by first construing the 
constitutional challenge as ‘procedural,’ and then invalidating the 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F.Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on 
other grounds, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 123. Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F.Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 124. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (stating “an 
alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense 
against his deportation”). 
 125. AADC, 525 U.S. at 491. 
 126. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903); Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 
12, at 1627–28; Legomsky, Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 12, at 298–99; see also supra note 
85.  
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decision on procedural due process grounds.”127 This approach is 
particularly evident in cases involving conditions of detention and 
has even been extended to apply in exclusion cases.128 It has not, 
however, been as prominent in cases involving substantive 
constitutional challenges to deportation orders.  
Another significant means by which noncitizens challenging 
immigration decisions have obtained greater judicial oversight is 
through the interpretation of statutes and regulations. Hiroshi 
Motomura has argued that the use of phantom constitutional norms to 
interpret the relevant statutes and regulations has enabled courts to 
provide more robust review.129 The constitutional norms utilized are 
phantom constitutional norms because they “are not indigenous to 
immigration law but come from mainstream public law instead.”130 
The indigenous constitutional norm that informs the interpretation of 
immigration statutes is the plenary power doctrine, which would 
provide for limited judicial review.131 The phantom constitutional 
norms  
operate indirectly, by serving as the unstated background context 
that informs our interpretation of statutes and other 
subconstitutional texts. In other words, contemporary 
constitutional law is a significant element of the legal culture that 
judges inevitably, if often subconsciously, absorb and rely upon 
when acting in their judicial capacity, including those instances 
in which they engage in statutory interpretation.132 
This approach has proved successful in allowing the judiciary to 
monitor and evaluate the ways in which immigration authorities 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 12, at 1628 (“procedural due process has served 
in a significant number of cases as a ‘surrogate’ for the substantive judicial review that the plenary 
power doctrine seems to bar”); see also Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 12, at 931–32. 
 128. Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 12, at 1628; Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra 
note 12, at 931–32. 
 129. Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 12, at 560.  
 130. Id. at 549.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 561. 
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utilize the State’s power to regulate immigration and even constrain 
the use of that power at times. The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in 
Zadvydas v. Davis exemplifies this trend.133 This case involved a 
challenge to the continued detention of noncitizens who were ordered 
to be removed, but who the government was unable to remove.134 
The relevant portion of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
permitted noncitizens ordered removed to be detained for ninety days 
in order to effectuate the removal. The statute also provided for a 
“post-removal period” in case the individual could not be removed 
within the ninety-day removal period, yet the statute was silent 
regarding the length of the post-removal period. The Court had to 
determine whether or not the government could detain a removable 
alien indefinitely under the statute. This was a case of statutory 
interpretation, yet the Court noted that because indefinite detention 
would “raise serious constitutional concerns,” the Court construed the 
statute to “contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation” subject to 
federal court review.135 The Government argued that the plenary 
power doctrine was applicable in this case such that the Court was 
required to defer to the political branches.136 The Court responded by 
noting that the political branches’ plenary power over immigration is 
“subject to important constitutional limitations.”137 The pressing 
question in the United States is who will monitor and enforce these 
constitutional limitations.  
By conceptualizing immigration as a political matter, the courts 
have decided not to perform this monitoring function in the vast 
majority of substantive constitutional challenges to deportation 
decisions. This has created a significant monitoring gap that neither 
Congress nor the Executive have sought to fill. As the earlier 
discussions in this Part have illustrated, the Court’s perspective of 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 134. The relevant statutory provisions deal with both exclusion and deportation. 
 135. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. The Court also noted “we believe that an alien's liberty interest is, at 
the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the 
Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent.” Id. at 696 (internal citations 
omitted).  
 136. Id. at 695. 
 137. Id. 
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Chinese immigration as a threat to national cohesion and a form of 
aggression, international law’s apparent lack of restrictions on a 
State’s power to expel and deport, and separation of powers concerns 
all supported the Court’s conclusion that immigration implicates 
national sovereignty and is, therefore, a political rather than a legal 
matter. Despite encroachments on the plenary power doctrine in the 
twentieth century, federal courts continue to refuse to apply 
traditional standards of review to substantive constitutional 
challenges to deportation decisions. It is my contention that this 
decision reflects the Court’s conclusion that immigration regulation 
implicates national sovereignty issues, which raise political questions 
that are not well suited to legal decision-making. As political matters 
it is appropriate for the judiciary to defer to Congress and the 
Executive in reviewing immigration laws, regulations, and decisions.  
II.  ADJUDICATING DEPORTATION IN EUROPE 
European deportation jurisprudence treats immigration matters as 
legal matters for which courts play a significant role in monitoring 
deportation decisions. European courts have been able to develop this 
role because of the fundamentally different way in which 
immigration regulation is conceptualized. The State’s power to 
regulate immigration is rooted in the State’s authority to protect 
public order.138 Much like the United States during the first century 
of our republic, regulating immigration is akin to regulating health 
and safety.139 In the United States the power to regulate for the 
protection of health and safety was retained by the states.140 In the 
face of growing pressure for national action in the area of 
immigration in the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court had to 
identify a different source of authority for federal immigration 
regulation. Europe has not faced a similar challenge and thus has 
retained the conception of immigration as a public order matter.  
                                                                                                                 
 138. The European concept of public order is akin to the police power idea in the United States. 
 139. Neuman, supra note 20, at 1894–96. 
 140. See, e.g., Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of 
the Federal Immigration Powers, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2010). 
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Europe’s history with large-scale immigration after World War II 
occurred at a time when the concept of individual human rights was 
prominent. This created a context in which European courts could 
view immigration as an issue of public order and thus as a legal 
matter rather than a political matter. This conclusion enables courts 
throughout Europe to play a significant role in monitoring State 
deportation decisions. This Part discusses the impact of Europe’s 
post-World War II history with large-scale immigration, public order 
as the basis for regulating immigration, and the allocation of this 
authority on the development of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (ECtHR) deportation jurisprudence. I have chosen to examine 
ECtHR jurisprudence because the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) provides the standard for individual rights protection 
within Europe. Domestic fundamental rights jurisprudence tracks that 
of the ECtHR because allegations of fundamental rights violations 
are often brought in domestic courts pursuant to the ECHR. Domestic 
courts adjudicate these claims and rely on ECtHR jurisprudence as 
binding precedent.141 As all members of the European Union are 
required to ratify the ECHR, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence offers the 
most efficient way to analyze deportation jurisprudence. This Part 
also analyzes the deportation jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) because it provides an international analogue to 
the ECtHR analysis.142 
Significant immigration within Western Europe grew for the same 
reason that Chinese immigration grew in the United States—the need 
for labor. After World War II, Western Europe needed to rebuild, and 
there was an inadequate supply of domestic labor. Immigrant labor 
was seen as an important and valuable resource in accomplishing the 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See, e.g., Mokrani v. France, App. No. 52206/99, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2005); Ezzouhdi v. 
France, App. No. 47160/99 (Feb. 13, 2001), http://www.echr.coe.int; Baghli v. France, 1999-I Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 170; Bouchelkia v. France, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 47; El Boujaïdi v. France, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
1980. 
 142. The Human Rights Committee is the body responsible for monitoring compliance with the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. See generally Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
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reconstruction goals.143 The assumption was that foreign workers 
would come for a limited period of time to address the labor demands 
and then return home once these demands were satisfied.144 There 
were two main sources of immigrant labor to Western Europe 
between 1945 and 1973—Southern Europe and former colonies.145 
For example, men from Italy and Spain were recruited in significant 
numbers to work in Britain, Belgium, France, and Switzerland. 
Countries like Britain, France, and the Netherlands also made use of 
immigrant labor from their former colonies.146 These workers began 
with the advantage of being citizens and thus were entitled to citizen-
based social and political rights, including protection from 
deportation. However, this beneficial status did not persist. As the 
former colonies obtained independence, the immigrants’ citizenship 
status changed.147 
Guest worker programs were created to address the low-skill labor 
needs. Guest workers were granted permits that provided for 
temporary residence and work authorization, but they generally were 
valid for specific jobs in specific areas.148 Governments discouraged 
guest workers from bringing dependents with them, but over time 
family reunification could not be prevented completely.149 Host states 
also limited the social and political rights of guest workers. By the 
early 1970s, Western Europe was experiencing a reversal of 
economic fortunes.150 The oil crisis was having a significant impact 
on economic growth, and the demand for labor in Western Europe 
declined significantly. Once the governments stopped actively 
recruiting guest workers, they assumed the immigration flows would 
stop and the current guest workers would return home. This 
                                                                                                                 
 143. STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL POPULATION 
MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 96–97 (2009). 
 144. Id. at 100–01. 
 145. Id. at 97, 101. In addition to Southern Europeans individuals from Finland and Ireland also 
migrated to more economically prosperous Western European States. Id. at 97. 
 146. For example, by 1970 over 600,000 Algerians, 140,000 Moroccans, and 90,000 Tunisians had 
immigrated to France. Id. at 99, 102. 
 147. Id. at 102–03. 
 148. Id. at 100. 
 149. CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 143, at 99–100, 102.  
 150. Id. at 100–03. 
35
Banks: Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
524
expectation did not occur, and these States began to realize that the 
guest worker model was giving rise to a permanent immigrant 
population.  
In Western Europe legal action was taken to prevent the growth of 
the immigrant population, and noncitizens challenged these actions as 
violations of their fundamental rights. An example of such action was 
limiting family reunification. In both France and Germany legislation 
was enacted that either suspended family reunification or created 
multi-year waiting periods.151 In 1978 the French Conseil d’État 
struck down a law suspending family reunification for noncitizens 
because it was contrary to the general legal principle protecting an 
individual’s right to family life.152 Migrant workers in Germany 
challenged restrictions on family reunification as a violation of 
Germany’s domestic protection of family life—Article 6 of the Basic 
Law.153 There is no distinction between citizens and noncitizens in 
Germany’s Basic Law, and the domestic court’s analysis of the 
family life claims mirrored the analysis that would have been 
conducted in a non-immigration case.154 In 1983 the Federal 
Constitutional Court in Germany prohibited Bavaria and Baden-
Wurtenberg from creating a three-year waiting period for the 
admission of noncitizen spouses. The court considered this measure a 
violation of Article 6 of the Basic Law.155 Western Europe’s 
experience with immigration, like that of the United States, grew 
exponentially during a time of economic boom. Once that boom 
subsided and fewer jobs were available, tensions arose and legal 
action was taken by the State to limit or prohibit future immigration. 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Virginie Guiraudon, European Courts and Foreigners’ Rights: A Comparative Study of Norms 
Diffusion, 34 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1088, 1100 (2000).  
 152. Id. 
 153. Tugrul Ansay, The New UN Convention in Light of the German and Turkish Experience, 25 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 831, 836–38 (1991) [hereinafter New UN Convention]; Tugrul Ansay, Legal 
Problems of Migrant Workers, in 3 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 24 (1977) [hereinafter Hague Lectures]. National courts in 
France and Germany limited the State’s ability to restrict or limit family-based migration. Guiraudon, 
supra note 151, at 1100.  
 154. Ansay, New UN Convention, supra note 153, at 836–37; Ansay, Hague Lectures, supra note 153, 
at 24; Guiraudon, supra note 151, at 1100. 
 155. Guiraudon, supra note 151, at 1100; see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 143, at 108. 
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Noncitizens in both jurisdictions challenged these actions as 
violations of their fundamental rights, yet European courts did not 
discuss immigration regulation as raising national sovereignty 
concerns—as threats to social cohesion or as a form of aggression. 
Rather, regulating the conduct and movement of immigrants was akin 
to regulating citizens, and the State was empowered to do so pursuant 
to its power to protect public order.156   
In viewing immigration challenges as raising legal issues rather 
than political issues, European States have a variety of legal texts to 
abide by. States not only have domestic bases for protecting 
individual rights, but also regional and international human rights 
treaties. Historically, international law has placed very few explicit 
limits on a State’s power to regulate immigration.157 Decisions 
regarding admission, conditions of residence, and deportation have 
largely been unregulated by international law, even by human rights 
treaties.158 Provisions within the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) exemplify this approach. 
CERD seeks to prohibit “distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
                                                                                                                 
 156. While European courts were reviewing immigration claims, European borders were vanishing in 
order to develop an economic community for the free movement of labor, goods, and capital. It is 
possible that the growth and legalization of European migration enabled European adjudicators to view 
immigration regulation as a matter of public order rather than national sovereignty. 
 157. A notable exception to the lack of international law regulating immigration is the regulation of 
asylum and refugees. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees limit a State’s right to exclude and expel refugees. Refugee is a term 
of art defined in each document essentially as an individual who is outside of their country of nationality 
and unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, art. 1(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967). 
Nonrefoulement and asylum are key obligations under these treaties. Nonrefoulement prevents a State 
from returning a refugee to territory where her life or freedom would be at risk or where she is at risk of 
being persecuted. Refugee Convention, supra note 157, at art. 33. Asylum enables a refugee to reside in 
a particular State with certain rights regarding employment and family reunification. THOMAS 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 845 (2008). 
 158. See Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U. CAL. DAVIS 
L. REV. 701, 721–29 (2005). 
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origin.”159 Yet the treaty states that it does “not apply to distinctions, 
exclusions, restrictions or preferences . . . [between] citizens and non-
citizens.”160 Additionally, the treaty does not regulate the rules States 
adopt regarding nationality, citizenship, or naturalization, provided 
that the rules “do not discriminate against any particular 
nationality.”161 Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights 
permits States to restrict the political activity of noncitizens.162 
Human rights enforcement bodies such as the Human Rights 
Committee have repeatedly stated that noncitizens do not have an 
independent right to reside in the territory of a State other than their 
State of citizenship.163 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights acknowledges that States may deport noncitizens, but 
does require that deportation proceedings comply with procedural 
due process norms.164 The European Court of Human Rights 
similarly acknowledges the expansiveness of States’ immigration 
power by noting that it “is a matter of well-established international 
law” that States can control the “entry, residence and expulsion of 
aliens.”165 Yet the introduction of these and other human rights 
                                                                                                                 
 159. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1(1), 
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.195 [hereinafter CERD]. 
 160. Id. at art. 1(2). The CERD Committee has, however, issued a general recommendation in which 
it encourages States to avoid “expulsions of non-citizens, especially of long-term residents, that would 
result in disproportionate interference with the right to family life.” CERD Committee, General 
Recommendation 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7/Add.1 (May 4, 2005). 
 161. Id. at art. 1(3). 
 162. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 16, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 163. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Winata v. Australia, Communication No. 930/2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (Aug. 16, 2001); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Madafferi v. Australia, 
Communication No. 1011/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001, at para. 9.7 (Aug. 26, 2004). The 
Human Rights Committee is the body responsible for monitoring State Party compliance with the 
ICCPR. Article 12(4) of the ICCPR provides that no “one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to 
enter his own country.” See infra note 164. 
 164. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(2), came into force Mar. 23, 1976, 
999 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States ratified this treaty in 1992.  
 165. Beldjoudi v. France, 229 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 74 (1992); Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 
131 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 28 (1988) (stating that the court “accepts that the Convention does not 
in principle prohibit the Contracting States from regulating the entry and length of stay of aliens”); 
Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 67 (1985) 
(noting that it is “a matter of well-established international law” that “a State has the right to control the 
entry of non-nationals into its territory”). 
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treaties has played an increasingly important role in regulating 
immigration, particularly within Europe.166  
The ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee provide robust 
review, through proportionality review, of challenges that deportation 
orders violate a noncitizen’s right to family life. The ICCPR provides 
that no individual “shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Human rights treaty obligations and the ECtHR jurisprudence have limited the State’s ability to 
deport noncitizens, and they have influenced the way in which political actors are allocating 
immigration rights. The provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR impact a significant portion of the 
world. As of February 2009, 85% of the United Nations Member States have ratified the ICCPR and 
94% of the European countries have ratified the ECHR. As of February 2009, 164 States have ratified 
the ICCPR and 47 have ratified the ECHR. Both of these treaties protect individuals in their capacity as 
humans rather than as citizens of a particular State. The ICCPR states that each State Party “undertakes 
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” the rights 
recognized in the treaty. ICCPR, supra note 164, at art. 2(1). Similarly the ECHR states that the “High 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” defined 
within the treaty. ECHR, supra note 162, at art. 1. In both of the treaties the substantive provisions 
discuss the rights as belonging to all individuals. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 164, at arts. 2, 6, 10; 
ECHR, supra note 162, at arts. 3, 4, 6. But see ICCPR, supra note 164, at art. 25 (protecting the right to 
participate in the conduct of public affairs, vote and be elected and have access to public service of 
citizens only); id. at art. 24 (protecting specific rights for children); id. at art. 27 (protecting community 
cultural rights for ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities). Consequently noncitizens have been able 
to challenge expulsion decisions based on a claim that the expulsion would violate an individual right 
protected in either the ICCPR or the ECHR.  
Additionally, recent European Union Council directives are allocating immigration-related rights 
based on an individual’s affiliation with the State of residence. These directives regulate admission and 
expulsion in a manner that comports with provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. For 
example, the opportunity to enter and protection against deportation are both given to noncitizens based 
on affiliation factors such as family connections within the State of residence and length of residence. In 
2003, the European Union Council issued a directive harmonizing the conditions for third-country 
nationals’ right to family reunification. Council Directive 2003/86, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12 (EC) 
(addressing the right to family reunification). Third-country nationals are those individuals who are not 
citizens of a European Union Member State. Id. at art. 2(a); Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, art. 17, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C224) 1 (as amended by Provisions Amending the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community With a View to Establishing the European Community 
art. G(5)). Pursuant to this directive, Member States are required to admit the noncitizen spouse and 
minor children of third-country nationals holding residence permits valid for at least one year who have 
reasonable prospects of obtaining permanent residence. Council Directive 2003/86, arts. 4, 3, 2003 O.J. 
(L 251) 12 (EC). Member States may additionally provide for the admission of long-term unmarried 
partners or unmarried adult children who are unable to provide for themselves. Long-term resident third-
country nationals also receive protection against deportation. Pursuant to a 2004 Council Directive, 
Member States are limited in their ability to expel long-term resident third-country nationals. Council 
Directive 2003/109, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 16) 44 (EC) (concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents). Deportation is only allowed if the noncitizen “constitutes an actual and 
sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public security.” Id. at art. 12(1). Any decision to deport 
such a noncitizen must take into account four factors: length of residence, age, consequences for the 
individual noncitizen and their family members, and connections with the country of residence or the 
absence of connections with the State of citizenship. Id. at art. 12(3). 
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interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”167 The ECHR notes 
that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence.”168 Any interference with this 
right has to be “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a 
democratic society.”169 Noncitizens throughout Europe have 
challenged expulsion orders170 on the ground that effectuating the 
expulsion would arbitrarily interfere with noncitizens’ family lives. 
Petitioners filing these cases have lived throughout Europe, but the 
vast majority of the cases arise in France.171 While each case presents 
a different set of facts, the general claim raised in these cases is that 
the noncitizens expelled will be deprived of their family lives because 
they will be separated from their spouse, partner, children, parents, or 
siblings. The noncitizen petitioners generally claim that it would be 
unreasonable for their family members to join them in their state of 
nationality because of language barriers, economic opportunities, or 
distance from non-nuclear family members.172  
                                                                                                                 
 167. ICCPR, supra note 164, at art. 17(1). 
 168. ECHR, supra note 162, at art. 8(1). 
 169. Id. at art. 8(2). The provision elaborates that the interference must be “necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” Id. 
 170. Expulsion orders are like deportation orders in that they mandate that the non-citizen leave the 
territorial boundaries of the State.   
 171. France was the respondent in twelve of the twenty-eight cases under review. See Mokrani v. 
France, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (2003); Ezzouhdi v. France, App. No. 47160/99 (2001), 
http://www.echr.coe.int; Baghli v. France, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 32 (1999); Bouchelkia v. France, 25 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 686 (1999); El Boujaïdi v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 223 (1999); Mehemi v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 739 (1999); Dalia v. France, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (1998); Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 419 
(1997); Boughanemi v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 (1996); Nasri v. France, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 458 
(1995); Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 32 801 (1992); Moustaquim v. Belgium, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
802 (1991). 
 172. Chair and J.B. v. Germany, App. No. 69735/01 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int; Kaya v. 
Germany, App. No. 31753/02 (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int; Maslov v. Austria, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 
(2007); Sezen v. The Netherlands, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2006); Üner v. The Netherlands, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 14 (2006); Lupsa v. Romania, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (2006); Keles v. Germany, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
12 (2005); Radovanovic v. Austria, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 (2004); Jakupovic v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
27 (2003); Mokrani v. France, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2003); Slivenko v. Latvia, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 
(2003); Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 (2002); Yildiz v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 
(2002); Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00 (2002), http://www.echr.coe.int; Ezzouhdi v. France, 
App. No. 47160/99 (2001), http://www.echr.coe.int; Bensaid v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 
(2001); Boultif v. Switzerland, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2001); Baghli v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 
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Between 1988 and mid-2008, the European Court of Human 
Rights decided twenty-eight cases in which noncitizens challenged 
expulsion orders based on Article 8 of the ECHR. Within roughly the 
same timeframe, the Human Rights Committee reviewed six 
expulsion orders that were challenged as violating Article 17.173 The 
ECtHR found violations in sixty-four percent of the cases, while the 
Human Rights Committee only found violations in thirty-three 
percent of the cases. Both of these adjudicative bodies conducted 
proportionality reviews to determine whether or not the expulsion of 
the noncitizen would violate the noncitizen’s right to family life as 
articulated in the ICCPR or the ECHR. In conducting a 
proportionality review, the ECtHR does not seek to “pass judgment” 
on a State’s “immigration and residence policy as such.”174 Rather it 
seeks to determine whether or not the expulsion decision “would 
constitute an interference with the rights protected by paragraph (1) 
of Article 8” and whether or not such interference is “‘necessary in a 
democratic society,’ that is to say justified by a pressing social need 
and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”175 
Similarly, the Human Rights Committee seeks to determine if the 
interference with family life can be justified. In making this 
determination, the HRC considers “the significance of the State 
party’s reasons for the removal of the person concerned” and “the 
                                                                                                                 
(1999); Bouchelkia v. France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686 (1999); El Boujaïdi v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
223 (1999); Mehemi v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739 (1999); Dalia v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 
(1998); Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 419 (1997); Boughanemi v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228 
(1996); C v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (1996); Nasri v. France, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458 (1995); 
Lamguindaz v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 213 (1993); Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
32 801 (1992); Moustaquim v. Belgium, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 (1991); Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 11 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 (1988). 
 173. The Human Rights Committee also addressed a similar challenge in Rajan & Rajan v. New 
Zealand, CCPR/C/78/D/820/1988 (2003). Yet in this case the petitioner was deemed deportable based 
on gaining entry under fraudulent means. The cases reviewed in this Article focus on deportation orders 
issued based on post-entry behavior, rather than deportation that corrects improper or incorrect 
admissions decisions. 
 174. Berrehab, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at para. 29; see also Moustaquim, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 at 
para. 43. 
 175. Moustaquim, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 at para. 44; see also Berrehab, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at 
para. 29. 
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degree of hardship the family and its members would encounter as a 
consequence of such removal.”176 
Both bodies repeatedly convey the idea that “there is significant 
scope for States parties to enforce their immigration policy and to 
require departure of unlawfully present persons.”177 The HRC has 
noted that it is “certainly unobjectionable” under the ICCPR “that a 
State party may require, under its laws, the departure of persons who 
remain in its territory beyond limited duration permits.”178 Yet the 
discretion that the State parties have is not absolute; it “may come to 
be exercised arbitrarily in certain circumstances.”179 In determining 
whether or not the exercise of the expulsion power is arbitrary or is 
“necessary in a democratic society,” both the ECtHR and the HRC 
acknowledge the rights of both the noncitizen and the State and seek 
to ensure that each is adequately protected. This review is conducted 
without automatically deferring to the State’s interest.  
The use of individual treaty rights to monitor and evaluate a State’s 
use of the power to regulate immigration is possible because of the 
conclusion by both the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee that 
immigration presents legal questions that can competently and 
justifiably be resolved by legal decision makers. In both of these 
bodies, the State power to regulate immigration is understood to be 
based on a State’s sovereign duty to maintain public order. This is a 
broad power enabling public authorities to regulate in the interest of 
protecting public welfare, peace, and security.180 The ECtHR has 
repeatedly noted that States have a sovereign right to maintain public 
order within their territory and that a feature of that sovereign power 
is regulating the residence of noncitizens. In Jakupovic v. Austria the 
court stated that  
                                                                                                                 
 176. Madafferi, supra note 163, at para. 9.8; see also Winata, supra note 163, at paras. 7.1–7.3.  
 177. Winata, supra note 163, at para. 7.3.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. See, e.g., Roger Warren Evans, French and German Administrative Law: With Some English 
Comparisons, 14 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1104, 1116 (1965). 
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[i]t is for the Contracting States to maintain public order, in 
particular by exercising their right, as a matter of well-
established international law and subject to their treaty 
obligations, to control the entry and residence of aliens. To that 
end they have the power to deport aliens convicted of criminal 
offences.181  
This sentiment was repeated in additional cases including Üner v. 
The Netherlands, a 2006 case decided by the Grand Chamber.182 
Unlike national sovereignty, public order regulation does not 
categorically involve sensitive political matters. Consequently, there 
is little reason for courts or other adjudicative bodies to exercise self-
restraint.  
Legal challenges by individuals regarding the manner in which the 
State exercises its power to protect public order are generally 
evaluated to determine whether or not the State action was necessary. 
This is the basis for proportionality review. Focus on the necessity of 
the State action is written into the ECHR provision protecting the 
right to private life and family life. Article 8 prohibits States from 
interfering with this individual right unless the interference is  
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Jakupovic v. Austria, App. No. 36757/97, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, at para. 25 (2004). 
 182. Üner v. The Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, at para. 51 (2007) (“[I]n 
pursuance of their task of maintaining public order, contracting states have the power to expel an alien 
convicted of criminal offences.”); see also Chair and J.B. v. Germany, App. No. 69735/01, at para. 56 
(2008), http://www.echr.coe.int (“In pursuance of their task of maintaining public order, Contracting 
States have the power to expel aliens convicted of criminal offences.”); Kaya v. Germany, App. No. 
31753/02, at para. 51 (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int (“In pursuance of their task of maintaining public 
order, Contracting States have the power to expel an alien convicted of criminal offences.”); 
Radovanovic v. Austria, App. No. 42703/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6, at para. 31 (2005) (“[I]t is for the 
Contracting States to maintain public order, in particular by exercising their right, as a matter of well-
established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry and residence of 
aliens. To that end they have the power to deport aliens convicted of criminal offences.”); Slivenko v. 
Latvia, App. No. 48321/99, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, at para. 115 (2004) (“It is for the Contracting States to 
maintain public order, in particular by exercising their right, as a matter of well-established international 
law and subject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry and residence of aliens . . . .”). 
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disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.183 
To determine necessity the ECtHR has required the State action to 
“correspond[] to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”184 In cases challenging 
deportation orders, the ECtHR has sought to determine whether or 
not the appropriate balance has been struck between the “legitimate 
[State] aim pursued” and the “seriousness of the interference with the 
applicant’s right to respect for their family life.”185 The legitimate 
State interest invoked has been the prevention of disorder, and in 
most of these cases, the noncitizens challenging their deportation had 
been ordered deported due to criminal convictions. The criminal 
convictions have ranged from assault to burglary to drug trafficking 
to rape.186 The ECtHR deportation jurisprudence reflects that the 
State interest implicated in deporting noncitizens is often crime 
control. The U.S. jurisprudence is still beholden to a doctrine that was 
created when immigration cases implicated the Chinese Exclusion 
Acts, communism, and terrorism. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court 
nor the lower courts have revised this doctrine to account for the wide 
variety of State interests at stake in regulating immigration. 
A.  Judicial Review with Proportionality Analysis 
1.  European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence 
Noncitizens frequently challenge deportation or expulsion 
decisions as a violation of their right to family life. The ECtHR has 
                                                                                                                 
 183. ECHR, at art. 8. 
 184. Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 , para. 28. (1988) 
 185. Id. at para. 29. 
 186. See, e.g., Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 801 (1992); Aoulmi v. France, App. No. 
50278/99 (2006); Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00 (2002), http://www.echr.coe.int; Baghli v. 
France, 33 Eur. H.R. 32; Bouchelkia v. France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686 (1999). A similar pattern exists in 
the United States—many noncitizens are deported due to a criminal violation. The latest figures 
available comparing deportation grounds indicate that 19.2% of noncitizens removed from the United 
States were removed due to a criminal violation. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 96 tbl.40 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf [hereinafter 2005 YEARBOOK]. 
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utilized proportionality review to examine these challenges in twenty-
eight cases between 1998 and mid-2008. Abdellah Berrehab brought 
the first case, which was decided in 1988. In 1983 Mr. Berrehab, 
Sonja Koster, and Rebecca Berrehab filed an application with the 
European Commission of Human Rights contending that the 
expulsion order issued against Mr. Berrehab violated his family rights 
in addition to those of Ms. Koster and Miss Berrehab.187 Mr. 
Berrehab and Ms. Koster married in 1977 and had a daughter, 
Rebecca, in 1979.188 After marrying in 1977, Mr. Berrehab obtained 
permission from the Dutch government to reside in the Netherlands 
“for the sole purpose of enabling him to live with his Dutch wife.”189 
Mr. Berrehab and Ms. Koster divorced in May 1979, and when Mr. 
Berrehab sought to renew his residence permit in December 1979, he 
was denied. The Dutch authorities denied the residence permit 
because granting it would “be contrary to the public interest” since 
“Mr. Berrehab had been allowed to remain in the Netherlands for the 
sole purpose of living with his Dutch wife, which condition was no 
longer fulfilled on account of the divorce.”190 Dutch law at the time 
allowed noncitizens who had been married for more than three years 
to apply for an independent residence permit if they had resided in 
the Netherlands with their spouse for at least one year.191 The purpose 
of this provision was to allow noncitizens who had “forged sufficient 
links with the country” to avoid making their immigration status 
subject to conditions.192 
Dutch courts recognized a right to family life as articulated in 
Article 8 of the ECHR and recognized that Mr. Berrehab’s right to 
family life could limit the State’s ability to exercise its immigration 
power, specifically its power to deport noncitizens.193 The Litigation 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Berrehab, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at para. 1. 
 188. Id. at paras. 7–8. 
 189. Id. at para. 8. 
 190. Id. at para. 10. 
 191. Id. at para. 15. The residence period in the Netherlands was initially three years, but it was 
subsequently reduced to one year. Id.  
 192. Id. at para. 15.  
 193. While the Dutch courts recognized this right, the Litigation Division of the Raad van State had 
taken a narrower conception of family life than the Court of Cassation had. The Litigation Division of 
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Division of the Raad van State evaluated the State interests involved 
and balanced them against Mr. Berrehab’s right to family life. This 
body concluded that Mr. Berrehab’s obligations to his daughter “did 
not serve any vital national interest and that those obligations 
subsisted independently of his place of residence.”194 More 
significantly, the Raad van State concluded that “four meetings a 
week were not sufficient to constitute family life within the meaning 
of Article 8” of the ECHR.195 Mr. Berrehab was arrested in 
December 1983 in order to effectuate his expulsion, and he was 
residing in Morocco in 1984.196 In August 1985, Mr. Berrehab and 
Ms. Koster remarried and Mr. Berrehab was granted permission to 
reside in the Netherlands “for the purpose of living with his Dutch 
wife and working during that time.”197 
The European Court of Human Rights’ analysis of Mr. Berrehab’s 
Article 8 claim turned on whether or not the expulsion was 
“necessary in a democratic society.”198 The court acknowledged that 
the failure to grant Mr. Berrehab a residence permit and his 
subsequent expulsion were in accordance with the law and for a 
legitimate aim.199 The court accepted that the ECHR “does not in 
principle prohibit the Contracting States from regulating the entry 
and length of stay of aliens.”200 Yet in order for the interference to be 
necessary, it must “correspond to a pressing social need and, in 
                                                                                                                 
the Raad van State is the adjudicative body that hears a full examination of the merits of the case while 
the Court of Cassation hears urgent applications. Berrehab, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at para. 16. 
 194. Id. at para. 11. The Litigation Division of the Raad van State concluded that the residence permit 
could be denied in the public interest because he “no longer satisfied the condition upon which the grant 
of the residence permit depended.” Id. at para. 11. Mr. Berrehab first appealed the denial of his residence 
permit to the Minister of Justice, who rejected the appeal. He appealed the Minister of Justice’s denial to 
the Litigation Division of the Raad van State, which dismissed his appeal. Id. at paras. 10–11. 
 195. Id. at para. 11. The Raad van State noted that the failure to grant Mr. Berrehab a residence permit 
would not “necessarily entail a break in relations between the child and her father, as the latter could 
remain in contact with his daughter by agreement with his ex-wife.” Id.  
 196. Id. at para. 12. 
 197. Id. at paras. 12–13. 
 198. Id. at para. 27. 
 199. Berrehab, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at paras. 24–26. The court concluded that the legitimate aim 
pursued by the Dutch government was “the preservation of the country’s economic well-being . . . rather 
than the prevention of disorder: the Government were in fact concerned, because of the population 
density, to regulate the labour market.” Id. at para. 26. 
 200. Id. at para. 28. 
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particular that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”201 
The court sought to determine whether or not the correct balance had 
been struck between the “legitimate aim pursued” and the 
“seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s right to respect 
for their family life.”202 In conducting this analysis, the court noted 
that Mr. Berrehab was not seeking entry to the Netherlands for the 
first time, but rather had already lived lawfully in the Netherlands for 
several years with a home and a job, and he had “real family ties” by 
marrying a Dutch woman, and a child was born of that union.203 
Rebecca’s young age heightened the impact of the interference of 
refusing the independent residence permit and the subsequent 
expulsion.204 In light of these facts, and that the Dutch government 
did not have any complaints about Mr. Berrehab during his residence 
in the Netherlands, the court concluded that the “proper balance was 
not achieved between the interests involved” such that “the means 
employed and the legitimate aim pursued” were disproportionate.205 
This case began to have an impact on the treatment of Article 8 
challenges to expulsion and deportation orders within national 
proceedings in Europe. Until this case was decided, noncitizens’ 
ECHR right to private life and family life was given little weight 
before the Conseil d’État in France. The French administrative courts 
looked to see whether or not the administrative official had exceeded 
his or her statutory authority. There was no examination of ECHR-
based substantive legal challenges to a deportation decision. This 
approach to fundamental rights challenges mirrors that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court during the mid-to-late nineteenth century.206 For 
example, in a 1980 case, Touami ben Abdeslem challenged his 
deportation order on the basis that it violated his right to family life 
under Article 8 of the ECHR. The French Conseil d’État held that “an 
alien cannot to any effect rely on . . . the provisions of Article 8 (art. 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at para. 29. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.   
 205. Berrehab, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at para 29.   
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 33–63. 
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8) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms . . . in support of his submissions asking for 
the deportation order against him to be set aside.”207 Five years later 
the same adjudicative body reiterated this approach when it held that 
“Article 8 . . . of the European Convention on Human Rights did not 
prevent exercise of the power conferred on the Minister of the 
Interior” by the relevant immigration regulation.208 Yet in 1991, the 
Conseil d’État changed course in the case of Mohand Beldjoudi. Mr. 
Beldjoudi challenged the deportation order issued against him on the 
ground that it violated his ECHR article 8 right to private life and 
family life.209 Unlike previous cases, the Conseil d’État reviewed Mr. 
Beldjoudi’s Article 8 claim; however, it concluded that the 
deportation order was necessary to protect public order due to the 
seriousness of the crimes committed.210 When the Conseil d’État 
issued its decision in Mr. Beldjoudi’s case, there was only one 
ECtHR case reviewing a deportation order in light of an Article 8 
challenge (Berrehab), and the court had yet to decide a case 
involving the expulsion of noncitizens based on criminal activity.211 
Mr. Beldjoudi’s case would eventually be decided by the ECtHR in 
1992, but before this case was decided, the Court decided 
Moustaquim v. Belgium in 1991, which was the ECtHR’s first case 
involving an expulsion order based upon criminal activity.  
Abderrahman Moustaquim arrived in Belgium in July 1965, at 
twenty-one months old, with his mother, in order to join his father 
who had immigrated to Belgium earlier and ran a butcher’s shop.212 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 801 at para. 27 (1992) (quoting Touami ben Abdeslem, 
[Recueil Lebon, tables], p. 820; JCP [Juris-Classeur périodique] 1981.II.19.613) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 208. Id. at para. 27 (citing Chrouki judgment of Dec. 6, 1985 (appeal no. 55912)). 
 209. Id. at para. 24. 
 210. Id. at para. 28. The use of international law within national French courts met with significant 
resistance until 1991 despite French ratification of the ECHR in 1974. It was not until 1981 that 
individual petitions under Article 25 of the Convention were permitted in France, and it was in 1988 that 
the Conseil d’État fully recognized that treaties, once signed, ratified, and published, take precedence 
over national statutes. Guiraudon, supra note 151, at 1094, 1102. 
 211. The only case decided was Berrehab v. Netherlands, which did not involve criminal activities. 
See 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322. 
 212. Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. A/193, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 at para. 9 (1991). 
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Mr. Moustaquim was a Moroccan national born in Casablanca.213 
Unlike Mr. Berrehab, Mr. Moustaquim had a criminal record. By 
1981 Mr. Moustaquim had 147 charges against him: 82 for 
aggravated theft, 39 for attempted aggravated theft, and 5 for 
robbery.214 He was eventually charged with 26 offenses and was 
ultimately found guilty of 22 of them and sentenced to two years 
imprisonment for aggravated theft, attempted aggravated theft, theft, 
and handling stolen goods.215 Additionally, he was sentenced to one 
month for destroying a vehicle, sixteen days for assault, and fifteen 
days for threatening behavior.216 He served eighteen months of this 
sentence before he was released in April 1984. 
While serving his sentence, the Ministry of Justice referred the 
case to the Advisory Board of Aliens. While this board concluded 
that deporting Mr. Moustaquim would be justified, it decided such 
action was not appropriate because of his young age at the time of the 
offenses and because he arrived in Belgium at approximately twenty-
one months old, his entire family lived in Belgium, he was learning a 
trade, and when he was granted prison leave he did not engage in any 
untoward behavior.217 Despite this decision, a royal order requiring 
Mr. Moustaquim to leave Belgium and not return for ten years was 
issued on February 28, 1984. This order was based on the conclusion 
that Mr. Moustaquim’s offenses constituted “serious prejudice to 
public order” and that as a “leader[] of a dangerous gang of juvenile 
delinquents” he was “a real danger to society.”218 Based on these 
factors, it was concluded that “the maintenance of public order must 
prevail over the social and family considerations set out by the 
Board.”219  
Mr. Moustaquim’s father applied to the Conseil d’État to have the 
execution of the deportation order stayed and to have the deportation 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Id. at para. 9. 
 214. Id. at para.10. 
 215. Id. at para. 15. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at para. 17. 
 218. Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. A/193, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 at para. 18 (1991). 
 219. Id.  
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order quashed.220 Both applications were rejected.221 Mr. 
Moustaquim’s father challenged the deportation order as a violation 
of Article 8 of the ECHR and in 1984 the Conseil d’État concluded 
that “respect for private and family life as guaranteed in Article 8 of 
the Convention is not an obstacle to the taking of a measure which, in 
a democratic society, is necessary for public safety.”222 At the time 
this decision was made, the ECtHR had yet to decide that a State’s 
interest in protecting public safety does not automatically trump a 
noncitizen’s right to private life and family life. Proportionality 
review, in cases involving deportation based on criminal activity, was 
not addressed until 1991 by the ECtHR in Mr. Moustaquim’s case. 
When the ECtHR was confronted with this issue, it conducted a 
proportionality review to determine whether or not the deportation of 
the noncitizen “would constitute an interference with the rights 
protected by paragraph (1) of Article 8” and whether or not such 
interference is “‘necessary in a democratic society,’ that is to say 
justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued.”223 The court concluded that “a proper 
balance was not achieved between the interests involved, and that the 
means employed was therefore disproportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.”224 This conclusion was based on Mr. Moustaquim’s family 
ties in Belgium, his arrival at a very young age, the almost two years 
that elapsed between the time he was incarcerated and the time he 
was ordered deported with no intervening criminal convictions, and 
his limited connections to Morocco.225 
Since Mr. Berrehab’s case, the ECtHR has been hearing Article 8 
challenges to deportation orders for approximately twenty years. In 
the first ten years, the ECtHR heard ten cases and found violations in 
five cases.226 During the second ten-year span of cases, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Id. at para. 20. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at para. 43. 
 224. Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. A/193, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 at para. 46 (1991).  
 225. Id. at paras. 43–46. 
 226. The ECtHR found violations in Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 (1988); 
Moustaquim, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802; Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 801 (1992); Nasri v. 
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heard eighteen cases and found Article 8 violations in twelve of the 
cases.227 In each of the cases the ECtHR conducted a proportionality 
review, and affiliation norms played a significant role in the court’s 
analysis. In determining whether or not deportation was proportionate 
to the public safety interests of the State, the ECtHR weighed not 
only the noncitizen’s affiliation with the state of residence, but also 
with his or her state of nationality. For example, in Moustaquim v. 
Belgium, the ECtHR noted that the petitioner had lived in Belgium 
since he was twenty-one months old and had only been to his country 
of nationality, Morocco, twice in twenty years.228 Similarly, in Nasri 
v. France, the court took note that Mr. Nasri had lived in France since 
age five and did not speak or understand Arabic, the language of his 
state of nationality, Algeria.229 This theme continues in the cases 
decided between 1998 and 2008. In Ezzouhdi v. France, the fact that 
the petitioner had “intense links with France” and that his only 
connection to Morocco was his nationality supported the court’s 
conclusion that deporting him would interfere with his private life 
and family life.230 A related but different concern raised by the 
ECtHR was the failure of noncitizens to naturalize. In Boughanemi v. 
France, Boujlifa v. France, Dalia v. France, Baghli v. France, and 
                                                                                                                 
France, App. No. A/324, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458 (1995); Mehemi v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 739 (1999) 
and did not find violations in Boughanemi v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228 (1996); Bouchelkia v. 
France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686 (1999); Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 419 (1997); El Boujaïdi v. 
France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 223 (1999). 
 227. During this time period the ECtHR found violations in Maslov, Sezen, Lupsa, Keles, 
Radovanovic, Jakupovic, Mokrani, Slivenko, Al-Nashif, Yildiz, Ezzouhdi, and Boultif. Maslov v. Austria, 
47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2007); Sezen v. The Netherlands, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2006); Lupsa v. 
Romania, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (2006); Keles v. Germany, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 (2005); Radovanovic v. 
Austria, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 (2004); Jakupovic v. Austria, 38 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 (2003); Mokrani v. 
France, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2003); Slivenko v. Latvia, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (2003); Al-Nashif v. 
Bulgaria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 (2002); Yildiz v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2002); Ezzouhdi v. 
France, App. No. 47160/99 (2001), http://www.echr.coe.int; Boultif v. Switzerland, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
50 (2001). The ECtHR did not find Article 8 violations in Chair and J.B. v. Germany, App. No. 
69735/01 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int; Kaya v. Germany, App. No. 31753/02 (2007), 
http://www.echr.coe.int; Üner v. The Netherlands, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. (2006); Bensaid v. United 
Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 (2001); Baghli v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (1999); Dalia v. France, 
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 (1998). 
 228. Moustaquim v. Belgium, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 at para. 45 (1991). 
 229. Nasri v. France, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458 at para. 38 (1996).  
 230. Ezzouhdi v. France, App. No. 47160/99 (Feb. 13, 2001), http://www.echr.coe.int; see also 
Radovanovic v. Austria, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 at para. 36 (2004) (noting that “his family and social ties 
with Austria were much stronger than with Serbia and Montenegro”). 
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Kaya v. Germany, the ECtHR used the petitioners’ failure to 
naturalize as a proxy for limited affiliation with the state of 
residence.231 In each of these cases, the ECtHR held that the State of 
residence did not violate the noncitizens’ Article 8 rights by ordering 
their deportation.232  
Proportionality review is the basis upon which the European Court 
of Human Rights determined whether or not a specific deportation 
decision violated fundamental rights.233 This court and domestic 
adjudicative bodies reviewing ECHR Article 8 claims are able to 
have such an active role in reviewing deportation decisions because 
immigration is treated as a legal, rather than a political, issue. 
Europe’s history with large-scale migration did not foster the idea 
that immigration is primarily a national sovereignty issue. These 
decision makers viewed immigration regulation as a function of 
regulating public order. As such, it did not raise the separation of 
powers or institutional competence concerns that U.S. courts 
confronted. This construction of immigration enabled legal decision 
makers to review challenges to deportation decisions as pure legal 
issues rather than political issues that required deference to political 
decision makers. This contrasts sharply with the role of U.S. courts. 
By conceptualizing immigration primarily as a national sovereignty 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Boughanemi v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at para 44 (1996); Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 419 at para. 44 (1997); Dalia v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 at para. 53 (1998); Baghli v. France, 
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 at para. 48 (1999); Kaya v. Germany, App. No. 31753/02 at para. 64 (2007), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 232. Boughanemi, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at para. 45; Boujlifa, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 419 at para. 45; Dalia, 
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 at para. 55; Baghli, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 at para. 49; Kaya, App. No. 31753/02 at 
para 71. 
 233.  See Daniel Thym, Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration 
Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 87, 93–101 (2008). This 
standard of review resembles the approach advocated in Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Fiallo, 
rather than the deferential approach required by the plenary power doctrine. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 809 (1977) (Marshall, J. dissenting); supra text accompanying note 111. Justice Marshall 
concluded that the statute used gender-based classifications, which required intermediate scrutiny. Fiallo 
430 U.S. at 809 (“We require that gender-based classifications ‘serve important governmental objectives 
and . . . be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.’” (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 
U.S. 313, 317 (1977))). While this standard of review does not mirror proportionality review, like 
proportionality review it enables a court to closely scrutinize the alleged rights violation. See Alec Stone 
Sweet & Judd Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 75–78 (2008–2009) (describing proportionality review and comparing it to strict 
scrutiny as used in the United States). 
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issue, immigration becomes a political matter. This conceptualization 
presents U.S. courts with separation of powers issues that support 
judicial deference to political actors.234 The Human Rights 
Committee has taken the approach of the ECtHR rather than that of 
the United States. 
2.  Human Rights Committee Jurisprudence 
Applying proportionality review, the Human Rights Committee, 
the body responsible for adjudicating individual complaints pursuant 
to the ICCPR, has twice decided that the deportation of a noncitizen 
would violate Article 17 of the ICCPR. Article 17 provides that “[n]o 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honor and reputation.”235 The HRC began hearing challenges to 
deportation orders in 1996, and between 1996 and 2004 it heard six 
such cases, finding violations in two cases.236 In the four cases in 
which the HRC found no violation of Article 17, the noncitizen 
petitioners had been convicted of crimes ranging from multiple petty 
offenses to aggravated assault.237 In the two cases in which the HRC 
found an Article 17 violation, the noncitizen petitioners had no 
criminal records within their state of residence.238 This contrasts with 
the ECtHR cases in which fifteen of the seventeen cases where the 
ECtHR found a violation of Article 8, the noncitizen petitioner had a 
criminal record.239 The HRC was more likely to conclude that 
                                                                                                                 
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 33–63. 
 235. ICCPR, supra note 164, at art. 17(1). 
 236. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Byahuranga v. Denmark, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1222/2003 
(Dec. 9, 2004) (no violation); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Madafferi v. Australia, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (Aug. 26, 2004) (violation); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Truong v. Canada, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/743/1997 (May 5, 2003) (no violation); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Winata 
v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (Aug. 16, 2001) (violation); U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Canepa v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (June 20, 1997) (no violation); U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Stewart v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (Dec. 16, 1996) (no 
violation).  
 237. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 236; Truong, supra note 236. 
 238. Winata, supra note 236; Madafferi, supra note 236.  
 239. Chair and J.B. v. Germany, App. No. 69735/01 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int; Kaya v. 
Germany, App. No. 31753/02 (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int; Maslov v. Austria, App. No. 1638/03, 47 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2007); Sezen v. The Netherlands, App. No. 50252/99, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2006); 
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separation from one’s family due to deportation was reasonable and 
proportionate when the noncitizen had criminal convictions within 
the State of residence. The ECtHR was less likely to find deportations 
in such instances proportionate, but that is due in great part to the 
wider range of factors considered by the ECtHR.240 Additionally, the 
HRC shows more deference to the balancing conducted by the 
national adjudicative bodies.241  
In 2001 and 2004, the Human Rights Committee concluded that 
Australia had violated the Article 17 rights of Francesco Madafferi, 
Hendrik Winata, and his wife So Lan Li by ordering their removal 
from Australia.242 Francesco Madafferi entered Australia in 1989 on a 
tourist visa valid for six months.243 Mr. Madafferi continued to reside 
in Australia after the expiration of his tourist visa and married Anna 
                                                                                                                 
Üner v. The Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. (2006); Lupsa v. Romania, App. No. 
10337/04, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (2006); Keles v. Germany, App. No. 32231/02, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 
(2005); Radovanovic v. Austria, App. No. 42703/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 (2004); Jakupovic v. Austria, 
App. No. 36757/97, 38 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 (2003); Mokrani v. France, App. No. 52206/99, 40 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 5 (2003); Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, App. No. 50963/99, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 (2002); Yildiz v. 
Austria, App. No. 37295/97, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2002); Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00 
(2002), http://www.echr.coe.int; Ezzouhdi v. France, App. No. 47160/99 (2001), 
http://www.echr.coe.int; Bensaid v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44599/98, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 (2001); 
Boultif v. Switzerland, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2001); Baghli v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (1999); 
Bouchelkia v. France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686 (1999); El Boujaïdi v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 223 
(1999); Mehemi v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739 (1999); Dalia v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 (1998); 
Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 419 (1997); Boughanemi v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228 (1996); 
C v. Belgium, App. No. 21794/93, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (1996); Nasri v. France, App. No. A/324, 21 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 458 (1995); Lamguindaz v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 213 (1993); Beldjoudi v. 
France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 801 (1992); Moustaquim v. Belgium, App. No. A/193, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
802 (1991).  
 240. While the ECtHR has examined a variety of affiliation factors, the HRC has focused on the 
family’s financial dependence on the noncitizen ordered deported and on whether or not the family ties 
would be severed. Stewart, supra note 236, at para. 3.2, 12.10; Canepa, supra note 236, at para. 11.5; 
Truong, supra note 236, at para. 7.4. 
 241. See, e.g., Byahuranga, supra note 236, at paras. 2.3, 11.9; Stewart, supra note 236, at para. 12.10. 
Another significant difference in these two bodies’ jurisprudence concerns the 1.5-generation. These are 
individuals who migrated to their state of residence as young children. Roberto G. Gonzales, Left Out 
But Not Shut Down: Political Activism and the Undocumented Student Movement, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. 
POL’Y 219, 221 (2008). Concerns regarding the deportation of this generation are addressed through the 
ECtHR’s analysis of affiliation factors. The fact that an individual migrated at a young age, has spent the 
majority of his or her life within the state of residence, and has social ties to the state of residence all 
weigh heavily in favor of finding a deportation order to be disproportionate. See KEES GROENENDIJK, 
ELSPETH GUILD & HALIL DOGAN, SECURITY OF RESIDENCE OF LONG-TERM MIGRANTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 15 (1998). 
 242. Madafferi, supra note 236, at para. 9.8; Winata, supra note 236, at paras. 7.1–7.3. 
 243. Madafferi, supra note 236, at para. 2.1. 
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Maria Madafferi, an Australian national. Mr. Madafferi incorrectly 
believed that his marriage to an Australian citizen automatically 
granted him residence status.244 The couple had four children born in 
Australia, and in 1996 Mr. Madafferi was brought to the attention of 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. At that 
time he filed an application to remain permanently in Australia as the 
spouse of an Australian citizen.245 Mr. Madafferi’s application was 
denied because he was considered to have a “bad character” based on 
his criminal record in Italy before his admission to Australia.246 On 
appeal, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal remanded the case to the 
Minister of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
yet the Minister decided to refuse Mr. Madafferi’s visa based on 
another provision of the Migration Act.247 The Minister explained 
that due to Mr. Madafferi’s prior convictions and outstanding prison 
term in Italy, it was in the national interest to remove him from 
Australia.248 
Mr. Winata arrived in Australia in 1985 on a visitor’s visa, and Ms. 
Li arrived in 1987 on a student visa. After Mr. Winata’s and Ms. Li’s 
visas expired, each remained in Australia unlawfully. Mr. Winata and 
Ms. Li met in Australia, entered into a relationship that was akin to 
marriage, and had a son in 1988 who is an Australian citizen.249 In 
1998 Mr. Winata and Ms. Li filed for asylum, claiming that they 
faced persecution in Indonesia, their State of nationality, on account 
of their Chinese ethnicity and Catholic religion.250 This claim was 
denied, and Mr. Winata and Ms. Li subsequently appealed to the 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, but the appeal 
was also denied.251 This appeal was based on Article 17 of the 
ICCPR, and they argued that they had “strong compassionate 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Id. at para. 2.2. 
 245. Id. at para. 2.3. 
 246. Id. at para. 2.4. 
 247. Id. at para. 2.5. 
 248. Id. at para. 2.7. 
 249. Winata, supra note 236, at para. 1. 
 250. Id. at para. 2.2. 
 251. Pursuant to section 417 of the Migration Act, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs may substitute a decision of Refugee Review Tribunal with a more favorable decision if such a 
decision would be in the public interest. Winata, supra note 236, at n.4. 
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circumstances such that failure to recognize them would result in 
irreparable harm and continuing hardship to an Australian family.”252  
In both of these cases, the petitioners filed complaints with the 
Human Rights Committee after exhausting their national remedies. In 
each case the Human Rights Committee sought to determine first 
whether or not the deportation would interfere with family and 
second whether or not that interference was arbitrary or objectively 
justified.253 In Madafferi’s case the HRC concluded: 
[A] decision by the State party to deport the father of a family 
with four minor children and to compel the family to choose 
whether they should accompany him or stay in the State party is 
to be considered “interference” with the family, at least in 
circumstances where, as here, substantial changes to a long-
settled family life would follow in either case.254 
In Winata, the HRC similarly concluded the deportation of Mr. 
Winata and Ms. Li would constitute an interference with family.255 
Articulating a similar justification, the HRC stated that  
a decision of the State party to deport two parents and to compel 
the family to choose whether a 13-year old child, who has 
attained citizenship of the State party after living there 10 years, 
either remains alone in the State party or accompanies his parents 
is to be considered “interference” with the family, at least in 
circumstances, where, as here, substantial changes to long-settled 
family life would follow in either case.256 
In determining the second prong of the Article 17 analysis, the 
HRC in Madafferi focused on balancing the State interests in 
deportation against the “hardship the family and its members would 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Id. at para. 2.6. 
 253. Madafferi, supra note 236, at para. 9.8; Winata, supra note 236, at para. 7.2. 
 254. Madafferi, supra note 236, at para. 9.7. 
 255. Winata, supra note 236, at para. 7.2. 
 256. Id.  
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encounter as a consequence of such removal.”257 In Winata, the HRC 
required Australia to demonstrate factors beyond enforcement of its 
immigration laws to justify the deportation of both parents of an 
Australian citizen.258 Unable to demonstrate additional factors, the 
HRC concluded that the removal of Mr. Winata and Ms. Li would be 
arbitrary. In balancing the various interests at stake in Madafferi, the 
HRC significantly discounted the factors supporting a conclusion that 
Mr. Madafferi was a person of bad character, and it gave significant 
weight to the factors supporting hardship to Mr. Madafferi’s family. 
The HRC noted that Mr. Madafferi’s outstanding sentences in Italy 
had been extinguished, there were no outstanding warrants for his 
arrest in Italy, and his criminal convictions in Italy were based on 
criminal acts committed twenty years ago.259 Additionally, the 
Committee noted the  
considerable hardship that would be imposed on a family that 
had been in existence for 14 years. If Mrs. Madafferi and the 
children were to decide to emigrate to Italy in order to avoid 
separation of the family, they would not only have to live in a 
country they do not know and whose language the children (two 
of whom are already 13 and 11 years old) do not speak, but 
would also have to take care, in an environment alien to them, of 
a husband and father whose mental health has been seriously 
troubled, in part by acts that can be ascribed to the State party.260 
In four other cases decided between 1996 and 2004, in which a 
noncitizen challenged an expulsion decision based on Article 17, the 
Committee found no violation. In those cases the HRC concluded 
that deporting the noncitizen was a proportionate response. The HRC 
gave significant weight to the State’s interest in promoting and 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Madafferi, supra note 236, at para. 9.8. 
 258. Winata, supra note 236, at para. 7.3. The HRC noted that Mr. Winata and Ms. Li had resided in 
Australia for fourteen years and their son was born in Australia, had attended Australian schools, and 
had developed “the social relationships inherent in that.” Id. 
 259. Madafferi, supra note 236, at para. 9.8. 
 260. Id. 
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protecting public safety and less weight to family ties in cases where 
the noncitizen was unmarried, had no children or was not the primary 
caregiver for the children, or was married to a noncitizen.261 Like the 
ECtHR, the HRC examined the noncitizen’s age at entry, length of 
time in the state of residence, family connections in the state of 
residence, the nature of the criminal offense involved, the number of 
criminal offenses committed, and the noncitizen’s criminal history.262 
The standards of review utilized by the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Human Rights Committee, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
demonstrate the variety of options available for judicial review of the 
same issue. The U.S. Supreme Court either looks for a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason for the government’s immigration 
decision or it defers to the government’s decision after concluding 
that officials responsible for making the immigration decision were 
acting within their authority.263 Neither the ECtHR nor the HRC 
provide this level of deference to the national authorities, although 
the margin of appreciation doctrine would allow such deference by 
the ECtHR. Rather, these adjudicative bodies utilize proportionality 
review to balance the interests of the States and the rights of the 
noncitizens. Both the HRC and the ECtHR seek to balance the State’s 
interest in public safety and enforcing the immigration laws with the 
noncitizen’s right to family. Viewing immigration regulation as 
public order regulation empowers both bodies to utilize 
nondeferential standards of review, which provides a forum in which 
the State’s use of the immigration power can be monitored and 
evaluated. 
The United States and Europe provide alternative approaches for 
regulating immigration and monitoring State use of the power to 
regulate immigration. The combined roles of administrative and 
judicial adjudicative bodies within the United States and Europe 
create different opportunities for States to ensure that noncitizens 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Stewart, supra note 236; Canepa, supra note 236; Truong, supra note 236. 
 262. Stewart, supra note 236; Canepa, supra note 236; Truong, supra note 236. 
 263. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794–95 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 
(1972); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); see also supra text accompanying notes 95–
111. 
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have a meaningful legislative, administrative, or judicial forum 
within which to challenge State use of the deportation power and 
have access to an effective remedy if required. The difference in the 
available opportunities is connected to the State interests understood 
to be at stake. Comparing the U.S. and European approaches to 
judicial monitoring and evaluation of immigration decisions provides 
an opportunity to think about alternative frames for analyzing 
immigration cases and the impact that such frames can have on a 
State’s ability to adhere to other fundamental norms like the rule of 
law. 
B.  Judicial Deference in Europe 
In this Article I have argued that European courts do not view 
immigration primarily as a national sovereignty issue, and 
consequently, do not automatically defer to political actors’ 
decisions. This does not mean, however, that the ECtHR or other 
European courts do not have doctrinal tools available to address 
immigration decisions that might implicate national sovereignty and 
require judicial deference. Both proportionality review and the 
margin of appreciation doctrine allow adjudicators to take account of 
these State interests. The use of proportionality review enables 
judicial bodies to balance the specific State interests involved 
(“legitimate aim pursued”)264 with the violation of the individual’s 
right. If the legitimate aim pursued is the prevention of disorder due 
to the noncitizen’s conviction for assault and battery, that case would 
be analyzed differently than one in which the legitimate aim pursued 
is protecting national security because the noncitizen has engaged in 
terrorism. The more serious the threat to the State’s public order or 
national security, the more likely the ECtHR will be to uphold the 
State’s deportation decision. For example, the seriousness of 
convictions for drug trafficking, rape, and manslaughter have 
weighed heavily in the State’s favor, and in these cases the ECtHR 
found that the deportation was not disproportionate and there was no 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at para. 28 (1988). 
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violation of Article 8.265 A State’s ability to protect its national 
security is not jeopardized by the use of proportionality review 
because this form of judicial review provides space for the 
seriousness of the State interest to be taken into account. The ECtHR 
has another mechanism by which it can accommodate sensitive State 
interests such as national security—the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. Rather than conducting the proportionality review, the 
ECtHR can decide that the issues at stake in the case implicate 
sensitive political matters such that the court should not exercise 
judicial review.266 This doctrine enables the ECtHR to exercise self-
restraint in the same way that the plenary power doctrine does.267 Yet 
the margin of appreciation doctrine is more akin to the political 
question doctrine in that it does not apply automatically to an entire 
subject area as the plenary power doctrine does to immigration. 
Institutional competence provides a justification for judicial 
deference. Within the United States, the Supreme Court has 
concluded that immigration decisions implicate national sovereignty 
for which the political branches have constitutional responsibility.268 
Thus, the political branches have greater institutional competence to 
balance the various interests at stake in deportation decisions. The 
ECtHR faces a different issue of competence: the relative 
competence of national authorities compared to that of an 
international body to review and decide claims alleging human rights 
violations.269 The issue of international versus national competence is 
particularly relevant in two contexts. The first context is when there 
                                                                                                                 
 265. Baghli v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 at para. 12 (1999) (drug trafficking conviction); 
Bouchelkia v. France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686 at para. 10 (1999) (aggravated rape conviction); Chair and 
J.B. v. Germany, App. No. 69735/01 at para. 13 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int (rape conviction); Dalia 
v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 at para. 8 (1998) (heroin trafficking conviction); Kaya v. Germany, 
App. No. 31753/02 at para. 12 (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int (attempted aggravated human trafficking 
conviction & aggravated battery conviction); Üner v. The Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99 at para. 15 
(manslaughter conviction). 
 266. GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 81 (2007). 
 267. See Ronald St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 123 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 
1993). 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 33–63. 
 269. LETSAS, supra note 266, at 90–91. 
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is no consensus within Europe regarding what counts as a human 
rights violation, and the second context is politically sensitive 
cases.270  
The first category of cases often addresses whether or not State 
interference with ECHR rights is “necessary in a democratic 
society.”271 This type of analysis often appears in cases in which the 
court is required to evaluate State interference with freedom of 
expression due to State regulation protecting freedom of religion.272 
For example, in Otto-Premiger-Institut v. Austria the court was faced 
with a challenge regarding the seizure and forfeiture of a film entitled 
Council in Heaven. Criminal charges were also brought alleging that 
the film “disparaged religious doctrines.”273 In conducting the 
proportionality analysis, the court noted that it was 
not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of what 
constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression where such expression is directed 
against religious feelings of others. A certain margin of 
appreciation is therefore to be left to the national authorities in 
assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of such 
interference.274 
Within the cases alleging an Article 8 violation due to an expulsion 
order, the ECtHR has not expressed any concern that there is a lack 
of consensus regarding what constitutes a violation. The ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence in this area suggests that there is a consensus that long-
term foreign residents should have a level of security of residence 
that is similar to that of citizens.275 This is likely connected to the 
                                                                                                                 
 270. Id. at 91. See supra text accompanying note 276 for discussion regarding the characterization of 
deportation decisions that makes the margin of appreciation doctrine is less applicable. 
 271. LETSAS, supra note 266, at 93. 
 272. Id. at 92–98 (discussing additional ECtHR cases). 
 273. Id. at 94 (citing Otto-Premiger-Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, para. 48 (1995)). 
 274. Id. (quoting Otto-Premiger-Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, para. 50 (1995)). 
 275. This is despite the fact that these cases require the court to determine whether or not an 
individual’s affiliation with the State of residence justifies continued residence despite engaging 
deportable behavior. See supra text accompanying notes 198–232 for discussion of the factors the 
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broader movement within the European Union and the Council of 
Europe to grant long-term third-country nationals the same 
substantive rights that Member State citizens enjoy.276 Citizens are 
not deported based on criminal activity, so only in the most extreme 
situations should long-term foreign residents be subjected to 
deportation. The second category of cases in which the ECtHR 
utilizes the margin of appreciation doctrine is politically sensitive 
matters. Concerns about the connection between deportation 
decisions and national sovereignty would fit within this category, yet 
the ECtHR does not make this connection in the same way that the 
U.S. Supreme Court does. The only State interests discussed by the 
court in these cases are public safety, public order, and enforcement 
of the immigration law.277 
In not significantly utilizing the margin of appreciation doctrine 
within the Article 8 jurisprudence regarding deportation, the ECtHR 
essentially exercises de novo review of the national authorities’ 
deportation decisions.278 Of the twenty-eight ECtHR cases addressing 
                                                                                                                 
ECtHR considers when evaluating allegations that the deportation of a noncitizen will violate their 
Article 8 right to private life and family life. 
 276. See Council Directive 2003/86, supra note 166, at arts. 4, 3; Council Directive 2003/109, supra 
note 166, at art. 12. 
 277. This is connected, however, to the types of cases that have been decided by the ECtHR. The 
Article 8 cases challenging deportation orders have not involved direct threats to a State’s physical 
security or to a State’s self-definition as occurred in the United States. As such, the ECtHR has been 
able to develop a framework for reviewing State immigration decisions in a context in which national 
sovereignty was not front and center. Yet concerns about the need for greater harmonization of 
immigration regulation across Europe have led to increasing regulation of immigration by the European 
Union and the Council of Europe. This move reinforces the idea that immigration is not seen 
categorically as raising politically sensitive matters such that the ECtHR should defer to the judgment of 
national authorities. 
 278. The court seeks to determine whether or not the State party “struck a fair balance between the 
relevant interests, namely the individuals’ rights protected by the Convention, on the one hand, and the 
community’s interests on the other.” Slivenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 at 
para. 113 (2003). This analysis focuses on affiliation factors and public safety to determine whether or 
not any “interference corresponds to a pressing social need and . . . that it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.” Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at para. 28 (1988). The 
affiliation factors examined include age at time of admission to the state of residence, length of stay, 
family and other ties within the state of residence, family and other ties within the state of nationality, 
ease of family to establish family life in state of nationality, and employment within the state of 
residence. The ECtHR balances these factors against the State’s interest in public safety and upholding 
the immigration legal regime. The vast majority of the ECtHR cases involve individuals deported due to 
criminal behavior. Thus the court reviews the nature of the criminal offense involved, the number of 
criminal offenses committed, and the noncitizen’s criminal history.  
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Article 8 claims and deportation, the margin of appreciation doctrine 
was addressed in seven cases, one of which was only in a dissent.279 
Of the remaining six cases, the doctrine was only mentioned as part 
of the government’s presentation in three cases, and there were only 
three cases in which the doctrine was addressed in the court’s 
analysis or holding.280 In the cases where the doctrine was addressed 
in the court’s analysis, the court stated that State parties are entitled 
to a certain margin of appreciation in determining whether or not 
State interference with an ECHR right is “necessary in a democratic 
society.”281 When the doctrine was addressed in the holding, the court 
simply declared that the State party overstepped their margin of 
appreciation.282 In these cases, the court appears to conflate granting 
discretion to the national authorities due to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine with the outcome of the proportionality analysis. For 
example, in Jakupovic v. Austria, the ECtHR concluded that “the 
Austrian authorities have overstepped their margin of appreciation 
under Article 8 as the reasons in support of the necessity of the 
residence prohibition are not sufficiently weighty.”283 Similarly, in 
Slivenko v. Latvia, the court concluded that “the Latvian authorities 
overstepped the margin of appreciation enjoyed by Contracting 
Parties in such a matter.”284 It appears that the reason the Latvian 
authorities overstepped the margin of appreciation enjoyed was 
because “they failed to strike a fair balance between the legitimate 
aim of the protection of national security and the interest of the 
protection of the applicants’ rights under Article 8.”285 The margin of 
appreciation doctrine is playing a minor role in the ECtHR’s Article 8 
jurisprudence related to deportation. It is my contention that this 
                                                                                                                 
 279. Maslov v. Austria, App. No. 1638/03, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2007). 
 280. Üner, Üner v. The Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (2006) (government); 
Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2001) (government); Radovanovic, 
Radovanovic v. Austria, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 (2004) (government); Jakupovic v. Austria, App. No. 
36757/97, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 (2003) (court); Slivenko, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (court); Berrehab, 11 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 (court). 
 281. Slivenko, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 at para. 113; Berrehab, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 at para. 28. 
 282. Jakupovic, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 at para 32; Slivenko, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 at para 128. 
 283. Jakupovic, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 at para. 20. 
 284. Slivenko, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 at para. 128. 
 285. Id. 
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doctrine is not very prominent within this jurisprudence because 
immigration is not seen as implicating inherently political decision 
making, and there is significant consensus throughout Europe about 
the right to family life. This is a right that has been recognized in 
numerous European State constitutions before the ratification of the 
ECHR.286 Additionally, national judicial bodies had a pre-ECtHR 
history of balancing State immigration interests with noncitizens’ 
interests in family life. This is most evident in challenges to family 
reunification restrictions.287 By viewing immigration as a public 
order issue, national and international judicial bodies do not have to 
address the separation of powers concerns raised when immigration 
is seen primarily as a national sovereignty issue. Additionally, the 
ECtHR was able to build upon existing national jurisprudence, 
balancing State interests in immigration and noncitizens’ rights to 
family life. This significantly reduced any ambiguity as to what 
interference with private and family life is “necessary in a democratic 
society” for noncitizens.288  
Courts within Europe provide robust judicial review of deportation 
decisions, not because they are enforcing human rights obligations, 
but because these cases are seen as raising legal rather than political 
questions. International law scholars and immigration scholars—
seeking greater judicial enforcement of international human rights 
obligations as a means for more judicial monitoring—fail to 
recognize this critical distinction. It is my contention that this 
distinction better explains the difference in U.S. and European 
judicial review of deportation decisions. The differences in 
immigration histories, sources of State authority to regulate 
immigration, and allocations of immigration authority in these 
jurisdictions have led to two different conceptions of immigration. 
U.S. courts see immigration regulation as implicating national 
sovereignty, while European courts see public order interests at the 
heart of immigration regulation. It is this difference that leads to 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Guiraudon, supra note 151, at 1100. 
 287. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 153–56. 
 288. Supra text accompanying note 281. 
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distinct understandings of the judicial role and to drastically different 
approaches to judicial review. Until there is a shift away from 
viewing immigration regulation as a political issue, U.S. courts will 
continue to play a minimal role in reviewing deportation decisions. 
Such a shift is critical, however, to ensure that the constitutional 
rights of noncitizens are adequately protected when they are facing 
deportation. 
III.  RETHINKING DEPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The use of a national sovereignty frame to analyze immigration 
decisions by U.S. courts is problematic because it fails to ensure that 
the substantive fundamental rights of noncitizens are protected in the 
deportation context. Use of a national sovereignty frame facilitates 
judicial deference to political actors, and it leaves no one monitoring 
deportation grounds or decisions for constitutionality. The lack of 
robust judicial review would be less problematic if the traditional 
concerns involved in regulating national sovereignty were at issue in 
regulating deportation. Yet the State interests at stake in most 
deportation cases are more akin to a State’s interest in crime control. 
This mismatch counsels against automatic judicial deference to 
political actors when reviewing deportation decisions.289 The ECtHR 
and the HRC offer an alternative frame for analyzing deportation 
decisions that is more closely aligned with the State interests at stake 
in most deportation cases. Yet use of that frame by U.S. courts will 
remain elusive until there is a shift in legal and public discourse about 
the State interests at stake in regulating immigration. 
A key feature of modern democratic governance is adhering to the 
rule of law and being accountable to the governed.290 In the context 
of regulating immigration, accountability requires structural 
mechanisms for monitoring, evaluating, and constraining when 
                                                                                                                 
 289. But see Mark Krikorian, Keeping Terror Out—Immigration Policy and Asymmetric Warfare, 
NATIONAL INTEREST, Spring 2004, at 77 (arguing that immigration policy is fundamental to protecting 
national security). 
 290. Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 34–35 (Thomas Carothers, ed. 2006).    
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necessary, the State’s power to regulate immigration. Deportation in 
both the United States and Europe operates within a system of laws 
that government officials utilize when deciding to deport a 
noncitizen. Yet, individual deportation decisions can and do 
challenge whether the State has exceeded the scope of its power by 
violating fundamental individual rights. The European system for 
adjudicating deportation decisions provides a forum in which these 
types of challenges can be rigorously reviewed. The ability to raise 
Article 8 claims before national adjudicative bodies and appeal those 
decisions to the ECtHR provides domestic and regional opportunities 
for legal review. The use of proportionality review by these bodies 
facilitates robust rather than deferential review. The United States 
provides limited opportunities for monitoring, evaluating, and 
constraining State use of the immigration power. The connection 
between immigration and national sovereignty has been critical to the 
creation and longevity of the plenary power doctrine as a limit to 
judicial review of substantive constitutional challenges to deportation 
orders.291 While the Court has not stated that substantive challenges 
to immigration decisions are nonjusticiable, it has stated that the 
“reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also 
dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the 
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and 
naturalization.”292 Congress and executive officials are obligated to 
uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution, yet there are no institutional 
mechanisms in place to review deportation grounds or deportation 
                                                                                                                 
 291. As Gerald Neuman has noted, 
But their [foreign nationals] substantive constitutional rights may not effectively 
constrain congressional deportation policy, and courts will apparently not protect them 
from being deported for engaging in activities for which they could not be ‘punished’ by 
imprisonment or even fine. Indeed, they can be deported for characteristics rather than 
activities, and for activities preceding the adoption for the policy as well as those 
postdating it. 
Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 620 (2006).  
 292. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1975) (internal citations omitted) (citing Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). While this case addressed Medicare eligibility requirements, the Court still 
noted that “decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers” and as such are 
more appropriately dealt with by the Legislature of the Executive. Id. at 81. 
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decisions for constitutionality.293 Courts defer to executive officials 
and Congress in the area of deportation, but there is no indication that 
these officials consider the substantive constitutional rights of 
noncitizens in making their decisions.294 Absent executive or 
congressional review of immigration decisions for consistency with 
substantive fundamental rights, the United States is not accountable 
for the constitutionality of its immigration decisions. This lack of 
accountability undermines the rule of law. This state of affairs would 
be more palatable if deportation decisions involved the same State 
interests as traditional national sovereignty matters. 
Regulating the foreign affairs component of national sovereignty 
implicates interstate relationships and diplomatic affairs. The national 
security component seeks to ensure the preservation of the State—
both its physical, political, social, and cultural components.295 Most 
deportation grounds are not concerned with addressing these 
interests.296 Overwhelmingly noncitizens are deportable for activities 
engaged in after admission—post-entry social control deportation 
grounds.297 The vast majority of these deportation grounds are related 
to criminal activity.298 Deporting noncitizens because they have 
                                                                                                                 
 293. There are mechanisms in place, however, to review procedural constitutional claims. See supra 
text accompanying notes 126–28. 
 294. See supra text accompanying notes 84–85 (noting that the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review does not have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the INA or specific immigration 
decisions). 
 295. The relationship that the United States, as a sovereign State, has with another sovereign State is 
based on political considerations. Immigration, however, regulates the relationship between an 
individual and a sovereign State. The United States has regulated immigration through interstate 
relationships. Between 1776 and the mid-1800s, the federal government regulated immigration through 
treaties. Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce treaties were used to grant the citizens of the treaty 
partner the ability to enter and reside in the United States. See Banks, supra note 36. 
 296. Immigration regulation can implicate interstate relationships, but it does not have to and rarely 
does. An example of this actually occurring was after the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran. Iranian students 
with nonimmigrant visas were required to report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to 
provide information regarding their residence and school enrollment. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard 
Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American 
Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1379–80 (2007). 
 297. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007).  
 298. The deportation grounds outlined in INA § 237 do not indicate an overwhelming State interest in 
national sovereignty. Of the seven broad categories of deportable activities, one covers national security 
and one covers criminal activities. Each of these categories has six sub-categories of related activities. 
For example, within criminal activities a noncitizen is deportable for general criminal activities, criminal 
activities related to controlled substances, firearms, miscellaneous, domestic violence, and trafficking. 
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stolen property or written a bad check is not an attempt at self-
preservation or maintaining or protecting interstate relationships or 
diplomatic affairs. Rather, it reflects the State’s interest in crime 
control. Deporting noncitizens who engage in criminal activity is 
seen as a tool for deterring future criminal activity and punishing past 
criminal conduct.299 Several senators clearly expressed these 
sentiments during debates about the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Senator William Roth noted 
that broadening the definition of aggravated felonies made “more 
crimes punishable by deportation,” and Senator Abraham remarked, 
“You don’t shut down the borders. What you do is you say we’re 
going to apply the criminal laws more harshly.”300 Crime-based 
deportation now accounts for a significant number of all deportations. 
In 2005, the last year that the Department of Homeland Security 
reported the administrative reason for deportations, criminal 
violations were the third most common reason for deportation.  The 
most common reasons were attempted entry without proper 
documents, through fraud, or misrepresentation and presence without 
authorization.301 This trend is evident from 1996 through 2005.302 
National security, on the other hand, only accounted for 10 of the 
208,521 removals in 2005.303 Crime-based deportations continue to 
                                                                                                                 
See INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2008). The security-related sub-categories include general 
security threatening activities, terrorist activities, activities implicating foreign policy, Nazi-related 
activities, violating religious freedoms, and recruiting or using child soldiers. See INA § 237(a)(4), 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2008). 
 299. See Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 (2009) (discussing 
Congressional motivations for crime-based deportation grounds).  
 300. See Lisa Zagaroli, Senators Use Rank to Set Pet Priorities, DET. NEWS, Mar. 23, 1997, at B5; 
Kanstroom, supra note 69, at 1894 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S4600). 
 301. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK, supra note 186, at 96 tbl.40. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. It is possible that additional noncitizens were deported due to national security concerns, yet 
the formal basis for the deportation was not related to national security. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A 
Global Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights Law Can Reform Our Immigration System, 
39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2008). However, in many instances it is easier for the government 
to deport a noncitizen under the national security deportation grounds rather than other deportation 
grounds. For example, the criminal activity deportation grounds generally require that the noncitizen 
have been convicted of the relevant activity in order to be deportable. See INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
1227(a)(2). The national security deportation grounds do not require a criminal conviction. The 
language of these deportation grounds only requires that the noncitizen engage in activity that is deemed 
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be significant. In 2008, thirty-nine percent of all noncitizens removed 
in non-expedited proceedings were removed based on criminal 
activity, and in 2007 the figure was approximately thirty-one 
percent.304 
Within the United States, national sovereignty interests in 
regulating immigration should be secondary, as they are in criminal 
law enforcement, when noncitizens are involved. Interstate issues can 
arise when noncitizens are charged with or convicted of state or 
federal crimes, but such issues rarely arise.305 The fact that criminal 
law enforcement can implicate national sovereignty does not exempt 
noncitizens from state criminal laws. Nor does it cause federal courts 
to defer to federal law enforcement officials when noncitizens allege 
a substantive constitutional violation. Rather, the default presumption 
is that the courts will perform the traditional judicial functions and 
review allegations of substantive constitutional violations. 
Alternative procedures exist to deal with the rare cases in which 
national sovereignty is implicated by state or federal criminal law 
enforcement. Judicial deference to federal law enforcement officials 
is not the default approach because the presumption is that criminal 
law enforcement implicates the State’s interest in public safety, not 
national sovereignty. A similar presumption should apply to 
regulating immigration.  
Judicial deference should be the exception rather than the rule in 
immigration adjudication. In the rare cases in which national 
                                                                                                                 
to threaten national security. For example, engaging in “any other criminal activity which endangers 
public safety or national security” makes a noncitizen deportable. INA § 237(a)(4)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. 
1227(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2006). The emphasis on public safety as the basis for a significant number of 
deportations fits with a history of communities in the United States using banishment as a tool for 
addressing public safety concerns. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 63–90 (2007). 
 304. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 102 tbl.37; U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008, supra note 1, at 4; U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., 2007 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 tbl.37 (2008) available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2007/ois_2007_yearbook.pdf; U.S. DEP’T 
HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2007, at 4 (2008) available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_07.pdf. These statistics 
include individuals who were denied admission and those who were deported. 
 305. But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 493–96 (2008) (addressing President’s attempt to 
comply with an International Court of Justice decision regarding noncitizens’ rights to consular relations 
when arrested).  
69
Banks: Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
558
sovereignty is implicated in a deportation case, it would be 
appropriate for a court to take these State interests into account when 
deciding the appropriate standard of review.306 The European Court 
of Human Rights has two mechanisms for dealing with this situation: 
first, recognizing the State interest in national security when 
conducting the proportionality review, and second, deferring to the 
decision of the national authority pursuant to the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.307 The existing political question doctrine 
provides a framework for U.S. courts to determine whether or not the 
court should exercise self-restraint and decline judicial review. In the 
vast majority of cases, the Baker v. Carr requirements for judicial 
deference would not be satisfied.308 
Europe is not unaware of the potential connection between 
immigration and national sovereignty. These States simply do not 
apply an irrebuttable presumption that all immigration cases 
implicate such interests, as the United States does. Rather, 
proportionality review allows these unique factors to be considered in 
a court’s analysis and the margin of appreciation doctrine allows the 
ECtHR to exercise self-restraint and decline to review a claim. 
Recognizing that most deportation decisions rarely involve national 
sovereignty interests is a critical first step for re-thinking the 
relationship between the judiciary and the political branches in 
ensuring that the State’s immigration decisions conform to the limits 
imposed by domestic and international law. 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Committee provides one approach for monitoring and 
                                                                                                                 
 306. Absent such a finding, traditional standards of review are more appropriate. This is the approach 
that Justice Marshall took in his dissenting opinion in Fiallo. After finding that the statutory scheme for 
admitting children at issue in this case was “unrelated to foreign policy concerns or threats to national 
security,” Justice Marshall concluded that there was no need for the Court to exercise self-restraint and 
utilize a deferential standard of review. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 808, 815–16 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 265–67 (discussing the ways in which the ECtHR is able to 
take national security concerns into account when adjudicating rights claims in the immigration context). 
 308. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Legomsky, Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 
12, at 265–69 for a detailed discussion of the application of the political question doctrine in the 
immigration context. Legomsky argues that in immigration cases in which foreign affairs are implicated, 
courts should “balance the likely impact of its interference against the importance of the individual right 
allegedly violated.” Id. at 268–69. 
70
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/2
2011] DEPORTING FAMILIES  
 
559
reviewing State immigration decisions, but it is an approach ill-suited 
to the current U.S. legal system. Conceptualizing immigration 
regulation as essentially legal rather than political is the most 
valuable insight from the European jurisprudence and the hardest to 
implement in the United States. It is our immigration history, source 
of State authority to regulate immigration, and allocation of 
immigration authority that make it difficult to view immigration as 
something other than political decisions about the physical, political, 
social, and cultural integrity of the State. Absent recognition that the 
national sovereignty interests implicated in immigration regulation 
are secondary, robust judicial review of deportation decisions will 
remain elusive.  
The link between immigration and national sovereignty has a long 
history in the United States.309 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area culminated in cases implicating the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts, the Cold War, and terrorism.310 The facts 
surrounding these cases have reinforced the idea that a State’s power 
to regulate immigration stems from the State’s sovereign duties and 
authority regarding national sovereignty.311 The fact that most 
immigration decisions, particularly deportation decisions, do not 
implicate national sovereignty has yet to be acknowledged by either 
the courts or the administrative bodies responsible for regulating 
immigration in the United States.312  
A combination of legal and non-legal strategies is necessary to 
shift the current understanding of the State interests at stake in 
regulating immigration. One important non-legal strategy is shifting 
the public discourse regarding immigration. The human rights 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See supra text accompanying notes 33–63.  
 310. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 473–75 (1999); U.S. ex 
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 207–08 (1953); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756 (1972); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S, 
149 U.S. 698, 699 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 581(1889). 
 311. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1832–35 (2007). 
 312. See id. at 1856–65 (“[C]urrent removal policies have almost nothing to do with national 
security.”); Legomsky, Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 12, at 268–70 (arguing that it is a 
stretch to conclude that the entirety of the INA affects national sovereignty interests and that even when 
such interests are implicated Baker v. Carr requires individualized review). 
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enforcement literature has empirically demonstrated that changing 
legal practices to correspond with new legal norms is a multi-stage 
process in which nonlegal factors play a critical role. Keck and 
Sikkink have demonstrated the importance of changing the discursive 
position of States and international organizations in achieving legal 
reform and the role that advocacy networks play in bringing about 
such discursive changes.313 These scholars have identified 
information, accountability, leverage, and symbolic politics as tactics 
useful in achieving this discursive goal.314 Shifting the frame used by 
U.S. courts to analyze deportation cases will similarly require a 
change in the discursive position of legal officials and more broadly, 
the public. 
National sovereignty concerns have dominated the comprehensive 
immigration reform debate.315 The popular media has played a 
significant role in maintaining the link between national sovereignty 
and immigration. News coverage over the past three years has 
consistently made a connection between immigration and security.316 
This connection was reinforced by the title of the 2005 House bill 
introduced for comprehensive immigration reform, “Border 
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 
2005.”317 The idea that immigration and national sovereignty are 
inescapably and permanently linked is prevalent throughout 
American society. This perception is distorting the national debate 
regarding comprehensive immigration reform by skewing the 
                                                                                                                 
 313. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
 314. See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 781, 800–01 n.101 (2009) (“Information politics is about 
‘quickly and credibly generat[ing] politically usable information and mov[ing] it to where it will have 
the most impact.’ Holding political actors to their commitments is the focus of accountability politics 
and leverage politics uses powerful actors to assist less powerful members of the network.” (quoting 
KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 313, at 16)) (internal citations omitted). Symbolic politics refers to the use 
of “symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far 
away.” KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 313, at 16. 
 315. See Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 296, at 1373; Chacón, supra note 311, at 1829–30. 
 316. A Westlaw search of the Major Newspapers database for the terms immigration /s “national 
security” provides numerous examples. 
 317. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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relationship between immigration and law enforcement,318 which 
facilitates breaching rule of law norms. The judicial use of a national 
sovereignty frame to analyze immigration cases gives rise to judicial 
deference, such that political actors are not monitored or evaluated to 
ensure that their actions comport with the substantive provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution. Nonlegal strategies will play an important role 
in shifting popular and legal understandings of the relationship 
between immigration and national sovereignty. A critical aspect of 
achieving comprehensive immigration reform that will create an 
effective and just immigration system is recognizing that regulating 
immigration implicates State interests such as economic 
development, family reunification, and social integration as well as 
national sovereignty. The European immigration jurisprudence assists 
with this conceptualization of immigration. Recognizing a broader 
range of State interests involved should support the development of a 
legal framework that can adequately monitor and evaluate 
immigration decision making yet still allow for judicial deference 
when required by national sovereignty. 
CONCLUSION 
The number of individuals residing outside of their state of 
nationality has grown exponentially over the last twenty years 
causing a significant portion of the world’s population to be 
vulnerable to deportation. This is a significant power that States hold, 
particularly with regard to long-term foreign residents who have been 
granted permission to reside in a State indefinitely. The manner in 
which a State exercises its deportation power can unsettle the lives of 
noncitizens, their families, and their communities, which often 
include citizens. As Justice Brewer stated in his dissenting opinion in 
Fong Yue Ting, “[e]very one knows that to be forcibly taken away 
from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and 
                                                                                                                 
 318. See Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 296; Chacón, supra note 311; Daniel Kanstroom, Reaping the 
Harvest: The Long, Complicated, Crucial Rhetorical Struggle over Deportation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1911 
(2007). 
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sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that 
oftentimes most severe and cruel.”319  
In this Article, I have argued that the United States and Europe 
have developed two different approaches for balancing the 
fundamental rights of noncitizens and the State’s right to deport 
undesirable noncitizens. The European approach treats fundamental 
rights challenges to deportation decisions as legal questions that legal 
institutions are competent to resolve. Alternatively, the United States 
treats these same claims as political questions that political actors are 
empowered to decide. The U.S. approach does not provide adequate 
institutional mechanisms by which political actors review deportation 
decisions for substantive constitutionality. While Congress’s 
enactment of the INA may represent a broad decision regarding the 
constitutionality of categories of deportation cases, it does not 
provide for individualized assessments. It is my contention that U.S. 
courts and European legal institutions developed these different 
approaches because of (1) their experiences with immigration, (2) the 
source of the State’s authority to regulate immigration, and (3) the 
allocation of that authority within the State. The United States’ 
experience with Chinese immigration in the mid- to late-nineteenth 
century enabled Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court to view 
immigration as a form of aggression that implicated foreign affairs. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court located the federal government’s authority 
to regulate immigration in its constitutionally granted power to 
declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrections, repel invasions, 
and regulate foreign commerce.320 European legal institutions, 
alternatively, identified the State’s power to protect public order as 
the basis for regulating immigration. This conception of immigration 
authority is not unknown within U.S. jurisprudence. As discussed, 
states regulated immigration in the United States between 1776 and 
1875, and this was understood to be an aspect of the state’s police 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Fong Yue Ting v. U.S, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
 320. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). “The United States are a sovereign and 
independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations, 
and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control, and to make it effective.” 
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711. 
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powers.321 Once there became a need for federal coordination of 
immigration law and policy, the Court had to identify a basis for 
federal rather than state regulation of immigration. Rooting federal 
authority in national sovereignty satisfied this goal. The Court 
appears to have had a broad conception of national sovereignty, one 
that included not only the physical security of the State, but also the 
social and cultural identity of the State. To the extent immigration 
implicates these interests, they are political decisions that are difficult 
to evaluate with legal standards. Yet deportation decisions, 
specifically crime-based deportation, do not readily implicate these 
broader self-definition and security concerns any more than state and 
federal criminal law do. Legal standards do exist to protect against 
retroactivity, ensure proportionality of punishment, and prohibit 
undue interference with family life. Until legal decision makers 
recognize the primacy of these interests rather than national 
sovereignty interests, judicial deference will continue. The European 
approach acknowledges the variety of State interests implicated in 
immigration decision making. Legal decision makers have the 
flexibility necessary to provide robust judicial review when faced 
with substantive fundamental rights challenges, but also deferential 
review when appropriate. The lack of judicial oversight in the United 
States minimizes the accountability of the political actors responsible 
for regulating immigration and increases the risk of arbitrary 
deportation decisions. This undermines the rule of law in the 
regulation of immigration. Shifting the meaning of immigration 
within U.S. legal discourse is one strategy for increasing the 
monitoring role that the judiciary can play. Absent movement away 
from viewing immigration through a national sovereignty frame, the 
judiciary’s monitoring and evaluative role will remain negligible. 
                                                                                                                 
 321. Neuman, supra note 20, at 1894–96. 
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